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FACEBOOK’S “OVERSIGHT BOARD:” MOVE FAST WITH STABLE 
INFRASTRUCTURE AND HUMILITY 
Evelyn Douek* 
Facebook’s proposed Oversight Board is one of the most 
ambitious constitution-making projects of the modern era. With pre-
existing governance of tech platforms delegitimized in the ongoing 
“techlash,” this represents a pivotal moment when new 
constitutional forms can emerge that will shape the future of online 
discourse. For all the potential of the Facebook Oversight Board 
(FOB), there are many things it cannot be. It will not hear a 
sufficient proportion of Facebook’s content moderation cases to be 
a meaningful response to calls for greater due process in individual 
decisions. Nor will it be able to become a font of globally accepted 
speech norms for the worldwide platform. The true value that the 
Board can bring to Facebook’s content moderation ecosystem lies 
between these two extremes of individual error correction and the 
settlement of globally applicable speech rules. The institutional 
offering of the Board should focus on two primary, but more modest, 
functions. First, it can help highlight weaknesses in the policy 
formation process at Facebook, removing blockages (such as blind 
spots and inertia) in the “legislative process” leading to the 
formulation of its Community Standards. Second, by providing an 
independent forum for the discussion of disputed content 
moderation decisions, the Board can be an important forum for the 
public reasoning necessary for persons in a pluralistic community 
to come to accept the rules that govern them, even if they disagree 
with the substance of those rules. Understanding the institutional 
role of the Board in these terms provides useful insights into the 
institutional design that will best help it achieve these goals. 
 
 *  Doctoral candidate, Harvard Law School. B. Com./LL.B. UNSW (Hons. I). 
Thanks are owed to Martha Minow, Jack Goldsmith, Cass Sunstein, Noah 
Feldman, Thomas Kadri, Elettra Bietti, Rafe Andrews and the editors of N.C. 
JOLT. I can’t fob my errors off onto anyone else though; they remain my own. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Mark Zuckerberg, the Founder and Chief Executive Officer of 
Facebook, is engaged in one of the most ambitious constitutional 
projects of the modern era. On November 15, 2018, he announced 
in a blog post that by the end of 2019, Facebook will “create a new 
way for people to appeal content decisions to an independent body, 
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whose decisions would be transparent and binding.”1 Facebook has 
since released a “Draft Charter,” describing the “Oversight Board” 
as “a body of independent experts who will review Facebook’s most 
challenging content decisions – focusing on important and disputed 
cases.”2 In an earlier interview, when he first floated the idea, 
Zuckerberg analogized the proposed body to a “Supreme Court.”3 
Thus, it seems that Zuckerberg is intending to introduce a check and 
balance into the governance of his sovereign domain of 
“Facebookistan.”4 
This innovation comes amidst ongoing constitutional upheaval 
for the Internet. The “techlash”5 of the past few years, started by 
revelations of fake news and disinformation in the 2016 U.S. 
election6 but sweeping broadly through the tech sector since then,7 
 
1 Mark Zuckerberg, A Blueprint for Content Governance and Enforcement, 
FACEBOOK (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-
zuckerberg/a-blueprint-for-content-governance-and-enforcement/ 
10156443129621634/ [https://perma.cc/C7P3-DLYT]. 
 2 DRAFT CHARTER: AN OVERSIGHT BOARD FOR CONTENT DECISIONS, 
FACEBOOK (Jan. 28, 2019) [hereinafter DRAFT CHARTER]. This paper reflects 
publicly-available details as of September 10, 2019. 
 3 Ezra Klein, Mark Zuckerberg on Facebook’s hardest year, and what comes 
next, VOX (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/4/2/17185052/mark-
zuckerberg-facebook-interview-fake-news-bots-cambridge 
[https://perma.cc/7A2Z-HT6D]. 
 4 See REBECCA MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED: THE WORLDWIDE 
STRUGGLE FOR INTERNET FREEDOM 149 (2012); Anupam Chander, 
Facebookistan, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1807 (2012). 
 5 Rana Foroohar, Year in a Word: Techlash, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/76578fba-fca1-11e8-ac00-57a2a826423e 
[https://perma.cc/8RJH-CV2B]; Eve Smith, The Techlash Against Amazon, 
Facebook and Google—And What They Can Do, ECONOMIST (Jan. 20, 2018), 
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/01/20/the-techlash-against-amazon-
facebook-and-google-and-what-they-can-do [https://perma.cc/BBH6-LNTY]; 
Word of the Year 2018: shortlist, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/word-of-the-year/shortlist-2018 
[https://perma.cc/G9D4-GTBV]. 
 6 OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, BACKGROUND TO “ASSESSING 
RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT US ELECTIONS:” THE 
ANALYTIC PROCESS AND CYBER INCIDENT ATTRIBUTION (Jan. 6, 2017). 
 7 Facebook has been under fire for everything from failing to prevent political 
operatives from having access to private data, to having a “determining role” in 
the ongoing genocide in Myanmar, to “poisoning” or “breaking” democracy. 
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has disrupted the status quo. Comparative scholarship shows that 
“[n]ew constitutional forms emerge only under extraordinary 
historical conditions, moments when pre-existing political, 
economic, and social structures have been weakened [or] 
delegitimized.”8 With prior content moderation practices receiving 
unprecedented public scrutiny and suffering a crisis of legitimacy, 
this moment represents such conditions for online platforms. The 
changes that emerge now will have significant ramifications for the 
future of online discourse, and because these online platforms 
mediate so much of modern life, sometimes called the “modern 
public square,”9 the effects will be far reaching. 
Facebook is the most globally dominant social media company, 
with 2.32 billion monthly active users in countries around the world 
using the service in over 100 different languages.10 The public 
discourse that occurs on Facebook is central to political and cultural 
life in and between countries around the world.11 As tech companies 
everywhere are looking for solutions to the problems of content 
moderation, Facebook’s governance innovation could provide a 
model—or cautionary tale—for others. This is therefore a pivotal 
moment in the history of online speech governance. 
 
Kevin Granville, Facebook and Cambridge Analytica: What You Need to Know 
as Fallout Widens, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/03/19/technology/facebook-cambridge-analytica-explained.html 
[https://perma.cc/5WGE-D9RK]; REUTERS, Myanmar: UN Blames Facebook for 
Spreading Hatred of Rohingya, GUARDIAN (Mar. 12, 2018), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/13/myanmar-un-blames-
facebook-for-spreading-hatred-of-rohingya [https://perma.cc/YYH9-ZJM7]; 
Zeynep Tufekci, It’s the (Democracy-Poisoning) Golden Age of Free Speech, 
WIRED (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/free-speech-issue-tech-
turmoil-new-censorship/ [https://perma.cc/LJB3-PPLW]; Evan Osnos, Can Mark 
Zuckerberg Fix Facebook Before It Breaks Democracy?, NEW YORKER (Sept. 17, 
2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/09/17/can-mark-zuckerberg-
fix-facebook-before-it-breaks-democracy [https://perma.cc/YUR5-BNHN]. 
 8 ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS 
IN EUROPE 38 (2000). 
 9 Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. ___,___ 8 (2017). 
 10 FACEBOOK NEWSROOM, https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ 
[https://perma.cc/BL5F-NR8S] (last visited Sept. 22, 2019). 
 11 ZEYNEP TUFEKCI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS: THE POWER AND FRAGILITY OF 
NETWORKED PROTEST 6 (2017). 
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For all the potential of the Facebook Oversight Board 
(hereinafter, FOB), there are many things it cannot be. Politicians,12 
academics,13 civil society,14 and users15 have long been calling for 
greater transparency and due process in Facebook’s application of 
its Community Standards and other content moderation decisions.16 
However, the FOB cannot be a meaningful answer to these calls. In 
other contexts, an appeal or some form of “judicial review” of a 
decision can be a form of due process: such mechanisms give 
complainants an opportunity to voice their grievance, have a 
hearing, and receive some form of explanation for their treatment.17 
Appeals processes can also be a way of ensuring the effective 
functioning of a bureaucratic system and rule enforcement by 
creating a mechanism for error correction. But the sheer volume of 
content moderation decisions Facebook makes every day18 means 
that the FOB cannot be expected to offer this kind of procedural 
recourse or error correction in anything but the smallest fraction of 
 
 12 Evelyn Douek, Transatlantic Techlash Continues as U.K. and U.S. 
Lawmakers Release Proposals for Regulation, LAWFARE (Aug. 8, 2018), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/transatlantic-techlash-continues-uk-and-us-
lawmakers-release-proposals-regulation [https://perma.cc/5CYR-LFJX]. 
 13 Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011 (2018); 
Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Global Platform Governance and Private Power in the 
Shadow of the State, 72 SMU L. REV. 66 (2019); Danielle Keats Citron, Extremist 
Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censorship Creep, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1035 (2018). 
 14 An Open Letter to Mark Zuckerberg, SANTA CLARA PRINCIPLES (Nov. 13, 
2018), https://santaclaraprinciples.org/images/scp-og.png [https://perma.cc/ 
EEQ5-ETFM]; David Kaye, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion 
and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/38/35 (June 4, 2018). 
 15 See, e.g., Civil society organizations, on behalf of 143,000 people, Letter to 
Mark Zuckerberg (Aug. 22, 2016) https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.sumofus.org/ 
images/FinalLetter-MarkZuckerberg_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZJS-ST5U]. 
 16 See TIMOTHY GARTON ASH ET AL., GLASNOST! NINE WAYS FACEBOOK 
CAN MAKE ITSELF A BETTER FORUM FOR FREE SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 18–20 
(2019). 
 17 Yuval Eylon & Alon Harel, The Right to Judicial Review, 92 VA. L. REV. 
991, 997 (2006). 
 18 See discussion infra at Part II(A). 
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these cases.19 This is compounded in Facebook’s case by the 
difficulty of ensuring the FOB’s decisions are effectively 
communicated and absorbed by the globally distributed and time-
starved workforce of content moderators that make the first instance 
content moderation decisions.20 
Tellingly, due process or individual error correction are not the 
reasons Facebook says it is establishing the FOB. “Due process” is 
not mentioned in Zuckerberg’s blog post announcing the blueprint 
for the body or in the Draft Charter released a few months later.21 As 
for error correction, Zuckerberg says that artificial intelligence and 
more content moderators will help reduce mistakes but “we will 
never be perfect.”22 Facebook seems to conceive of the FOB as 
something different, and grander. In describing the function of the 
body, the Draft Charter explains that because decisions over what 
should and should not be allowed on Facebook are “too 
consequential for Facebook to make alone”23 the FOB will review 
the “most challenging content decisions” to provide oversight and 
make Facebook more accountable.24 It will be charged with 
reviewing enforcement of Facebook’s Community Standards—
which “apply around the world to all types of content”25—in 
 
 19 Issie Lapowsky, Real Facebook Oversight Requires More Than a 40-Expert 
Board, WIRED (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-oversight-
board-draft-charter/ [https://perma.cc/ZYU9-F6JB]. 
 20 See, e.g., Sarah T. Roberts, Social Media’s Silent Filter, ATLANTIC (Mar. 8, 
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/03/commercial-
content-moderation/518796/ [https://perma.cc/3EEG-T28K] (“In a matter of 
seconds, following pre-determined company policy, CCM workers make 
decisions about the appropriateness of images, video, or postings that appear on a 
given site . . . Increasingly, CCM work is done globally, . . . CCM workers are 
almost always contractors, in many cases limited in term due to their high rate of 
burnout.”). 
 21 Zuckerberg, supra note 1. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Nick Clegg, Charting a Course for an Oversight Board for Content 
Decisions,  FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Jan. 28, 2019) https://newsroom.fb.com/ 
news/2019/01/oversight-board/ [https://perma.cc/9A4W-XAM2]. 
 24 DRAFT CHARTER, supra note 2, at 1. 
 25 Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/ 
communitystandards/introduction/ [https://perma.cc/5ZXL-VTF8] (last visited 
Sept. 22, 2019). 
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accordance with a set of indisputably worthy and sweeping values 
“like voice, safety, equity, dignity, equality and privacy.”26 
However, if the vision of the FOB is to be a magisterial font of 
global speech norms for the global platform, this too is mistaken. 
The FOB will never be the ultimate arbiter of free speech norms 
around the world whose pronouncements are accepted as legitimate 
in the way a court of final appeal might in a domestic legal system. 
It has neither the legitimacy nor authority necessary to fulfil this 
role. 
The true value that the FOB can bring to Facebook’s content 
moderation ecosystem lies between these two extremes of individual 
error correction and the settlement of globally applicable speech 
rules. The institutional offering of the FOB should focus on two 
primary, but more modest, functions. First, it can help highlight 
weaknesses in the policy formation process at Facebook, removing 
blockages (such as blind spots and inertia) in the “legislative 
process” leading to the formulation of its Community Standards.27 
Second, by providing an independent forum for the discussion of 
disputed content moderation decisions, the FOB can be an important 
forum for the process of public reasoning necessary for persons in a 
pluralistic community to come to accept the rules that govern them, 
even if they disagree with the substance of those rules.28 
Understanding the institutional role of the FOB in these terms 
provides useful insights into the institutional design that will best 
help it achieve these goals. 
This article proceeds in four parts. Part II looks at the context for 
the introduction of the FOB into Facebook’s content moderation 
ecosystem. Content moderation—determining what should and 
shouldn’t be allowed on Facebook’s platform—is both an 
impossible and indispensable part of Facebook’s business. This 
paradox sheds light on why Facebook would voluntarily subject 
itself to the constraints of an independent appeal body. Key amongst 
the reasons for establishing the FOB is the desire to find a way of 
 
 26 DRAFT CHARTER, supra note 2, at 3. 
 27 Rosalind Dixon, The Core Case for Weak-Form Judicial Review, 38 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2193 (2017). 
 28 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 212 (2005). 
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legitimizing the power that Facebook exercises over its users and 
the public sphere. It is only in understanding this context that we can 
begin to ask what would make the FOB’s institutional design 
effective.  
Part III sketches the current vision of the FOB based on early 
documents describing its institutional design. While not final, these 
documents reveal key design decisions, such as the intended 
membership of the FOB, its power to review Facebook decisions, 
and the scope of its jurisdiction. 
Part IV turns to the limitations on the FOB and the ways in which 
it differs from any prior institution that make the legitimizing goal 
especially difficult for the FOB. Not only will it be difficult for 
Facebook to make credible its commitment to be bound by the FOB 
in cases where its decisions are damaging to the company’s business 
interests, but the FOB also does not have a reservoir of legitimacy 
to draw on when making deeply contested decisions. The FOB will 
need to establish its legitimacy over time, and its task will be all the 
more challenging in these circumstances. 
Part V turns to the ways in which Facebook can maximize the 
value the FOB can bring to its content moderation ecosystem in light 
of these inherent limitations. The value of a judicial-style check does 
not require the FOB to have ultimate say in all decisions; indeed, a 
“weak-form” judicial review model may be more appropriate in the 
dynamic environment of online speech. Nor does the FOB need to 
issue universally-accepted decisions; indeed, it will not be able to. 
But it is the process of public reasoning itself which is the raison 
d’être of the FOB and should be the focus of the body’s design. 
The FOB is an experiment in governance that responds to an 
unprecedented amount of control by a private platform over the 
global public sphere. It will not and should not be a copy of any 
institution from a radically different context. This does not mean 
that there is not much that can be learned from previous experience 
before the beta version of this updated form of platform governance 
is released. This paper explores those lessons. 
OCT. 2019] Facebook's Oversight Board 9 
II. THE FOB’S PURPOSE 
On its face, Zuckerberg and Facebook’s decision to set up the 
FOB might seem counterintuitive. Content moderation—platforms’ 
practice of designing and enforcing rules for what they allow to be 
posted on their services—is, as Gillespie says, the commodity that 
platforms offer users.29 The decision to move some of the power 
over this core part of Facebook’s business into independent hands 
may seem puzzling. Public pressure over Facebook’s decisions in 
recent years is not enough to explain the move. Zuckerberg is 
insulated from the need to respond to public pressure by his near 
absolute control of the company as founder, chief executive, 
chairman of the Board, and majority shareowner.30 But as 
Facebook’s Head of Policy Management has written: “[s]imply put, 
there are business reasons that a big social media company must pay 
attention to what the world thinks of its speech rules.”31 The goals 
of the FOB need to be understood in the context of how it might 
serve these business imperatives. 
There is a much more familiar context in which holders of 
expansive unilateral power nevertheless employ a court system as a 
check and balance: rulers in authoritarian regimes. Scholars have 
previously drawn the comparison of Facebook as an autocracy32 due 
 
 29 TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET: PLATFORMS, 
CONTENT MODERATION, AND THE HIDDEN DECISIONS THAT SHAPE SOCIAL 
MEDIA 5 (2018). 
 30 Julia Carrie Wong, Zuckerberg’s Control of Facebook is near Absolute – 




 31 Monika Bickert, Defining the Boundaries of Free Speech on Social Media, 
in THE FREE SPEECH CENTURY 254, 265 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone 
eds., 2018). 
 32 David Pozen, Authoritarian Constitutionalism in Facebookland, KNIGHT 
FIRST AMEND. INST. (Oct. 30, 2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/ 
content/authoritarian-constitutionalism-facebookland [https://perma.cc/PP95-
Z3RD] (drawing on Mark Tushnet’s characterization of absolutist 
constitutionalism as a system as one where “a single decisionmaker motivated by 
an interest in the nation’s well-being consults widely and protects civil liberties 
generally, but in the end, decides on a course of action in the decisionmaker’s sole 
discretion, unchecked by any other institutions.”); Balkin, supra note 13, at 2024; 
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to Zuckerberg’s unchecked power over what Zuckerberg calls the 
Facebook “community.”33 The introduction of the FOB therefore 
raises the same question that comparative constitutional literature 
has grappled with: why do dictators allow courts any degree of 
judicial independence which might interfere with their power?34 To 
be clear, the use of the term “authoritarian” is descriptive and 
without normative judgment. Facebook is a company, not a nation 
state.35 Authoritarianism in the sense of an executive having 
decision-making capacity unbounded by formal internal checks is 
not unusual in this context. But the analogy is helpful in 
understanding why Facebook might introduce an “independent” 
check and balance into its governance.36 
After briefly sketching the impossible challenge of content 
moderation that the FOB is intended to help solve, this section draws 
on the rich literature on courts in authoritarian regimes to examine 
the reasons the FOB, and the renunciation of power that it 
represents, might appeal to Facebook as a solution. 
A. Facebook’s Approach to the Impossible Task of Content 
Moderation 
Consistent and coherent content moderation on the scale of a 
platform like Facebook is essentially an impossible challenge. 
 
Henry Farrell et al., Mark Zuckerberg Runs a Nation-State, and He’s the King, 
VOX (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/4/9/17214752/ 
zuckerberg-facebook-power-regulation-data-privacy-control-political-theory-
data-breach-king [https://perma.cc/W2Z3-EQED]; MACKINNON, supra note 4; 
Chander, supra note 4. 
 33 Justin Hendrix, Is Facebook a Community? Digital Experts Weigh In, JUST 
SECURITY (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/54850/facebook-
community-digital-experts-weigh/ [https://perma.cc/2UNT-JQY5]. 
 34 See generally MEHDI SHADMEHR ET AL., JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN AUTOCRACIES (2019); RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF 
COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES (Tamir Moustafa & Tom Ginsburg eds., 
2008). 
 35 ANDREW KEANE WOODS, TECH FIRMS ARE NOT SOVEREIGNS (2018). 
 36 See, e.g., Tamir Moustafa, Law and Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, 10 
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 281 (2014) (discussing the rich literature of the 
dynamics of courts in authoritarian regimes that helps explain how such 
institutions can further an autocrat’s aims). 
OCT. 2019] Facebook's Oversight Board 11 
Facebook has over 2 billion monthly active users,37 and over 2.5 
billion pieces of content are shared on its platform every day.38 This 
content is moderated to align with Facebook’s public rules, called 
“Community Standards,”39 and its internal guidelines.40 In the first 
quarter of 2019 alone, Facebook “took action” on nearly 1.873 
billion pieces of content for being in breach of these rules.41 
Excluding the 1.8 billion pieces of content Facebook marked as 
spam, this means Facebook classified nearly 73 million pieces of 
content as falling within the other categories in its Community 
Standards: adult nudity and sexual activity, bullying and 
harassment, child nudity and sexual exploitation of children, hate 
speech, regulated goods, global terrorist propaganda, and violence 
and graphic content.42 Because not every piece of content flagged 
for review is actually found to violate Facebook’s rules, these 
numbers represent only a subset of flagged items that Facebook 
evaluates.43 Facebook receives more than a million reports of 
violations of its content standards per day.44 As well as reviewing 
these reports, Facebook also re-reviews decisions that are appealed 
by users. In the first quarter of 2019, Facebook received nearly 25 
million requests for appeal—around 275,000 requests per day.45 
Clearly, this does not give the 30,000 people Facebook currently 
employs to enforce its Community Standards much time to consider 
each decision.46 
 
 37 FACEBOOK NEWSROOM, supra note 10. 
 38 GILLESPIE, supra note 29, at 114. 
 39 Community Standards, supra note 25. 
 40  Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes 
Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1638–9 (2018). 
 41 Community Standards, supra note 25. 
 42 Id. 
 43 See GILLESPIE, supra note 29, at 74. 
 44 Bickert, supra note 31, at 256. 
 45 Community Standards, supra note 25 (calculations on file with the author). 
 46 Zuckerberg, supra note 1. For insight into the tough working conditions of 
front line content moderators, see SARAH T. ROBERTS, BEHIND THE SCREEN: 
CONTENT MODERATION IN THE SHADOWS OF SOCIAL MEDIA (2019). 
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Simply employing more people would not solve Facebook’s 
moderation woes (although it could certainly help).47 While a larger 
workforce might be able to more carefully consider each decision 
(for example, by looking at more contextual information that might 
shed light on the intended meaning of a particular post), this might 
come at the cost of greater consistency between decisions.48 
Consistency is an important indicator of fairness. Because of this, 
and because of the sheer number of content moderation decisions 
Facebook has to make, the company has developed an “industrial” 
approach to content moderation.49 The goal is to create a “decision 
factory,” where application of Community Standards is reduced to 
bright-line rules, whose application is routinized and efficient.50 
This attempted clean-cut approach has attracted controversy, such 
as over the strict use of “protected categories” in Facebook’s hate 
speech policy leading to posts attacking “white men” being found to 
contravene the Standards but not those targeting “black children.”51 
Another tool Facebook uses to make content moderation at scale 
manageable is artificial intelligence (AI).52 In his Blueprint, 
Zuckerberg calls AI “the single most important improvement in 
enforcing our policies,” because it can quickly and proactively 
identify harmful content.53 This further reflects Facebook’s 
 
 47 Ellen Silver, Hard Questions: Who Reviews Objectionable Content on 
Facebook — And Is the Company Doing Enough to Support Them?, FACEBOOK 
(July 26, 2018) https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/07/hard-questions-content-
reviewers/ [https://perma.cc/2WGP-VPHQ] (explaining that Facebook itself has 
recognized this, doubling its content moderation staff in 2018). 
 48 ROBYN CAPLAN, DATA & SOCIETY, CONTENT OR CONTEXT MODERATION? 6, 
13 (2018). 
 49 GILLESPIE, supra note 29, at 77. 
 50 Caplan, supra note 48, at 24. 
 51 Julia Angwin & Hannes Grassegger, Facebook’s Secret Censorship Rules 
Protect White Men From Hate Speech But Not Black Children, PROPUBLICA (June 
28, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-hate-speech-censorship-
internal-documents-algorithms [https://perma.cc/P4SU-Z7YK]. 
 52 Drew Harwell, AI Will Solve Facebook’s Most Vexing Problems, Mark 




 53 Zuckerberg, supra note 1. 
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mechanistic approach to content moderation. For every category 
except bullying and harassment, and hate speech, Facebook found 
over 95% of the content it took down as violating its Community 
Standards before it was reported by a user, in large part because of 
its AI. But the exception of bullying and harassment, and hate 
speech is telling: these two categories of content are harder for 
Facebook to proactively identify because they are so highly context-
dependent. As Facebook notes, bullying and harrassment reports 
“tend to be personal and context-specific, so in many instances we 
need a person to report this behavior to us before we can identify or 
remove it. This results in a lower proactive detection rate than other 
types of violations.”54 Hate speech is notoriously difficult to detect 
through automated processes, because it depends so much on 
linguistic nuance, intention, and local norms.55 Context is all-
important at these “complex frontiers of political speech, dangerous 
speech, and hate speech.”56 So while AI is a necessary part of content 
moderation at scale, it is not sufficient. 
Even if it was technologically possible to train AI to appreciate 
the infinite spectrum of human nuance, there are at least two more 
reasons why AI cannot be a complete answer to the content 
moderation problem. 
First, AI does not give a person who has a decision made against 
them the substance or feeling of due process or of being heard.57 AI 
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also does not give public reasoning for its decisions, which, as 
argued below,58 is an essential component of a legitimate content 
moderation system. 
Second, and even more fundamentally, AI cannot be a full 
answer to the difficulties of content moderation because AI cannot 
determine the anterior question of the values that should be encoded 
into the detection algorithms. Before asking AI to identify and 
remove hate speech from the platform, for example, it has to be told 
what to look for. But what constitutes impermissible hate speech is 
an essentially contested concept that varies around the world.59 As 
one Facebook representative writes, “[t]here is no universally 
accepted answer for when something crosses the line. Although a 
number of countries have laws against hate speech, their definitions 
of it vary significantly.”60 A well-known example is Holocaust 
denial. As a fairly concrete category of speech, less context 
dependent than many others, this might be a prime example of 
speech that AI might be able to more easily identify. But while 
Holocaust denial is illegal in several countries,61 it is famously not 
in the United States where the decision that Nazis should be allowed 
to march in front of Holocaust survivors is seen as one of the “truly 
great victories” in American legal history.62 AI itself cannot choose 
between these two opposing conceptions of free speech: it has to be 
told whether to find and remove Holocaust denial by a human. 
Another example is Facebook’s exception to its Community 
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Standards for content it deems to be “newsworthy.”63 These cases 
require a balancing of the harm caused by allowing speech that 
breaches Facebook’s rules to remain on the platform against the 
public interest in being informed about the particular matter. Such 
balancing cannot be done in the abstract or ex ante and encoded into 
an algorithm, but requires case-by-case consideration. 
Enter Facebook’s “Oversight Board,” which could temper the 
industrial application of content moderation rules at scale. The FOB 
can give a user an opportunity to be heard, and will then consider all 
the relevant context and competing values at stake in the case at 
hand. But more importantly, the FOB will offer an explanation for 
why content is or is not allowed on Facebook’s platform. 
B.  The Benefits of Voluntary Restraints 
The question remains, however, why outsource this role to an 
independent body? Greater transparency and reason-giving could be 
provided by Facebook employees and policy-makers within the 
current content moderation ecosystem. And despite growing calls,64 
Zuckerberg is showing no signs of wanting to relinquish any of his 
enormously powerful roles at his company.65 His enjoyment of this 
power is a matter of legend.66 
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Nevertheless, the establishment of the FOB does constitute a 
renunciation of a degree of Facebook’s power. The FOB will have 
the power to reverse Facebook’s decisions,67 constraining the 
otherwise plenary discretion that Facebook currently has over what 
appears on its platform.68 Its establishment will recreate a system of 
separation of powers, where an independent judicial-style body will 
oversee the other branches of Facebook’s content moderation: the 
legislative branch that writes Facebook’s content moderation rules, 
and executive actors who implement these rules (with the help of 
AI). This is an unprecedented governance structure for a private 
company. But it is, of course, the dominant form of governance in 
nation states. 
The matter should not be overstated—Zuckerberg is not 
recreating liberal democratic governance. He is not subjecting 
himself or his role to democratic accountability. But the FOB 
initiative is in keeping with Zuckerberg’s long-standing 
pronouncements that Facebook is “more like a government than a 
traditional company.”69 By initially referring to the FOB as a 
“Supreme Court” and calling its rules of operation a “Charter,” for 
example, Zuckerberg is implicitly distinguishing the FOB from 
other, more well-known forms of online dispute resolution (ODR) 
such as eBay’s Resolution Center.70 The message is that this is not 
ordinary commercial customer relations management; this is 
something grander. And the distinction is accurate. While most 
ODR systems are directed at resolving disputes between two private 
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parties (such as a buyer and seller),71 the FOB will be resolving 
disputes more analogous to public law. The disputes it will hear will 
revolve around the exercise of power by the “government” of 
Facebook.72 In making decisions about the rules in what has become 
a key channel of public discourse, the FOB’s decisions will also 
need to take into account a broader conception of the “public 
interest,” rather than the mere resolution of the immediate dispute 
before it. So, while many of these other ODR systems are 
increasingly looking to automate processes and displace human 
dispute handlers,73 the FOB looks to reintroduce and elevate the 
human component, recalling more conventional offline dispute 
resolution bodies. 
There are four apparent reasons why this governance structure 
may appeal to Facebook for solving the content moderation 
dilemmas outlined above: (1) bestowing content-moderation 
decisions with an aura of legitimacy, aiding user-relations; 
(2) staving off or guiding more extensive governmental regulation; 
(3) outsourcing controversial decisions away from the company; and 
(4) facilitating better enforcement of existing standards. These 
closely track the reasons authoritarian regimes often retain court 
systems at least somewhat independent from the regime.74 
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1. Bestowing Legitimacy and Reassuring Users 
Legitimacy is central to the FOB experiment. The topic of 
legitimacy is discussed at length below,75 but two points are worth 
noting here. First, “legitimacy” can mean many things and is hard to 
define.76 Throughout this paper, references to “legitimacy” are 
references to what Fallon calls “sociological legitimacy”—that is, 
the prevailing public attitude towards Facebook’s content 
moderation.77 Importantly, legitimacy does not mean correctness; 
instead, “in circumstances of relatively widespread reasonable 
disagreement, . . . legitimacy connote[s] respect-worthiness.”78 
Therefore, the mission to legitimate Facebook’s content moderation 
ecosystem aims to create a situation where its decisions are 
generally considered somewhat worthy of respect, even if there are 
those that still disagree with the substance of those decisions. The 
second point worth noting is that this definition of legitimacy 
highlights the very low baseline from which Facebook is operating. 
In the past few years, Facebook’s decisions have increasingly come 
to be viewed as inconsistent and arbitrary, and therefore 
illegitimate.79 A recent Pew survey found that only 31% of U.S. 
adults have a great deal or fair amount of confidence in social media 
companies to determine what offensive content should be removed 
from their platforms.80 For the FOB to be successful in conferring 
legitimacy to Facebook’s content moderation, it does not need to 
create a situation where content moderation comes to be viewed as 
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perfectly legitimate. In some ways, the FOB’s job is much simpler 
than that: it only needs to create improvements over the current state 
of widespread perceptions of illegitimacy. 
Independent, court-like institutions are one tool for mitigating 
the extent to which an otherwise unconstrained ruler’s decisions are 
viewed as wholly illegitimate. As Dixon and Landau write, “[w]hen 
exercising powers of judicial review, most courts are . . . afforded a 
degree of presumptive legitimacy.”81 Authoritarian regimes use 
courts in this way: because they lack democratic procedural 
legitimacy in the exercise of power, such regimes often use courts 
to give a patina of more substantive legitimacy to their rule.82 Why 
should such regimes care about legitimacy in the first place? For 
authoritarian regimes, legitimacy is important because it can reduce 
the costs and necessity of resorting to force to maintain power.83 For 
Facebook, the calculation is somewhat different but not entirely so. 
Because “code is law,”84 Facebook’s enforcement of its rules does 
not rely on force in the same way.85 However, such enforcement will 
have other costs if stakeholders oppose Facebook’s rulings. 
Facebook needs the approval of governments, users, advertisers, and 
the media in establishing its speech norms because these 
stakeholders can exert commercial pressure on the company—these 
are the “business reasons” that Facebook must pay attention to 
external reactions to how it polices its platform.86 
Indeed, because “exit” (i.e. leaving the platform) is easier than 
physical exit from a state, the costs of illegitimate decisions may be 
even greater. While network effects make it more unlikely that 
Facebook will become the next Myspace, a social media graveyard 
of abandoned profiles,87 the last few years of scandals no doubt make 
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Facebook afraid to be complacent. As a Facebook-commissioned 
report by a group of independent academics explained: 
Facebook has considerable capacity to manage its content regulation 
process in a top down manner which pays minimal attention to users’ 
views. However, the very existence of the [Community Standards 
Enforcement Report] highlights the recognition that public views about 
Facebook and its attitude about the public matter. They matter for the 
individual user both because disgruntled users find ways to circumvent 
rules, for example opening multiple accounts. In addition, unhappy 
customers are less likely to use the site and more likely to seek 
alternatives to it.88 
Put simply, authoritarians and companies value legitimacy 
because it can reduce the costs of decisions with which people 
disagree.89 
Perceived legitimacy not only improves Facebook’s relationship 
with its users, but also with its commercial partners such as 
advertisers. Such partners may be dissuaded from dealing with 
Facebook if it becomes too unpredictable or entails high reputational 
costs. Again, this may seem a distant threat given Facebook’s 
practical duopoly over online advertising, but it no doubt still factors 
into Facebook’s decisions. The FOB’s role in mitigating this threat 
again resembles the way authoritarian regimes use courts to respond 
to foreign investor fears over an unpredictable local business 
environment.90 As Moustafa observes, “[i]n the age of global 
competition for capital, it is difficult to find any government that is 
not engaged in some program of judicial reform designed to make 
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purpose of attracting global capital.”91 For example, Egypt bolstered 
its court processes in the late-1950s and 1960s to stem the severe 
capital flight it was experiencing as investors became wary of the 
consolidation of unchecked power in the Nasser regime.92 For both 
users and commercial partners, then, an independent body 
overseeing content moderation can reassure these stakeholders, 
raising the value of the Facebook “product” of content moderation 
by making it appear more stable and less subject to Facebook’s 
whims.93 
Courts are also a relatively low-cost way of achieving these 
legitimacy gains. For many authoritarian regimes, “[g]ranting 
access to the courts was a concrete way to relieve political pressure 
without opening the political system.”94 That is, a court-like check 
is a far more limited surrender of power, defined in scope, than 
wholesale reform of the policy-making institutions. Facebook may 
think that by surrendering some power over content moderation 
decisions to the FOB, it is bolstering its claim to run the community 
for the benefit of its users and thereby weakening calls for more 
extensive reforms to decision-making at the company. 
2. Staving Off or Guiding Regulation 
Facebook may view the establishment of the FOB as a way of 
forestalling more extensive governmental regulation or at least as an 
opportunity to shape the form that such regulation may take. As tech 
platforms’ power and the related number of controversies grow, 
there is a growing sense that new laws are “inevitable.”95 Even 
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Zuckerberg himself is now calling for global regulation of “harmful 
content.”96 In the absence of global regulation, an ad hoc patchwork 
of local regulations could be costlier for companies by requiring 
them to comply with multiple different sets of rules. Research shows 
that even relatively modest voluntary efforts by private firms to 
restrain their own behavior can stave off much more stringent public 
regulations.97 A good example of this is ad transparency on social 
media platforms. Facebook, Google, and Twitter have all recently 
unveiled voluntary ad transparency measures.98 Meanwhile, the 
proposed Honest Ads Act, which would compel these sorts of 
disclosures, has made little progress in Congress,99 despite extensive 
reporting about weaknesses in Facebook’s ad transparency tools.100 
Another example is tech platforms entering into voluntary Code of 
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Conduct agreements with the European Union, which held off 
coercive measures.101 
Voluntary reforms can benefit governments too. Effectively 
regulating tech companies will be extremely difficult, and if done 
poorly, governments may be left taking the blame for poor 
outcomes. Self-regulatory reform at Facebook may make a lack of 
governmental regulation more politically tenable for politicians by 
showing some form of progress. Authoritarian states use formal 
compliance with constitutional requirements in this way, to help 
reduce the political costs for other states to maintain alliances.102 A 
recent report commissioned by the French government shows this 
dynamic playing out, with Facebook’s voluntary reforms 
influencing the model of regulation ultimately endorsed by the 
report’s authors. They recommended a model that focused on 
“expanding and legitimizing” platform self-regulation based on “the 
progress made in the last 12 months by . . . Facebook,”103 showing 
that self-imposed platform reform and regulatory reform occur in 
dialogue with one another.104 
In some countries, the reform may be more anticipatory than 
others. In the U.S., the FOB might be seen as an attempt to preempt 
calls to narrow intermediary immunity provisions to deny platforms 
protection if they fail to take reasonable steps to prevent their 
services being used maliciously.105 In other countries, the reform 
may merely be responsive to certain regulations that have already 
been put in place. A notable example is recent regulation in 
Germany that Facebook’s head of policy for Europe has described 
as already “pushing us to the role of the court, the role of the legal 
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system.”106 In either case, Facebook’s establishment of the FOB 
makes it not merely a passive recipient of regulatory mandates but a 
proactive player in the design of the future of Internet governance. 
3. Outsourcing Controversy 
For many of the issues that arise in the course of content 
moderation, there will be no “right” answer and any decision is 
likely to upset a certain constituency. The FOB allows Facebook to 
pass the responsibility for these divisive decisions to an independent 
body: a renunciation of power in the hope of also outsourcing some 
of the blame for contentious choices. 
A desire for Facebook to no longer bear the brunt of public 
opprobrium for content moderation decisions is evident in 
Zuckerberg’s call for third-party bodies to set global standards for 
“harmful content.”107 A more independent body set up by regulators 
would further distance Facebook from these choices, but global 
cooperation is unlikely to be forthcoming in the near future, if ever. 
Setting up the FOB might be seen as the next-best alternative. 
Democratic108 and authoritarian regimes109 alike use courts as a 
shield for controversy that can attend divisive political decisions.110 
Despite having “no influence over either the sword or the purse,”111 
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courts are obeyed by other governmental actors at least in part 
because “[d]isaffected citizens can then blame the [courts], not 
elected officials, for their disappointments.”112 
The motivation to avert blame is not limited to governments—
other actors can also use the law to avoid social backlash for their 
decisions. For example, many voluntarily segregated restaurants and 
hotels lobbied for civil rights legislation that would have forced 
them to desegregate.113 Segregation was commercially costly for 
hotels, depriving them of black customers, but voluntarily 
desegregating would have imposed a social cost in their prejudiced 
communities. Civil rights legislation made desegregation a matter 
of legal compliance rather than a decision with social meaning, and 
outsourced the value judgment.114 
Similarly, when the FOB decides that a certain popular 
commentator should be banned for sprouting hate speech or that 
certain misleading political content should be left up rather than 
completely removed, Facebook can cast implementing these 
decisions as mere compliance rather than its own politically-charged 
decisions. This fits with Facebook’s own professed image as 
apolitical, and agnostic as to the ideology of content on its 
platform.115 Facebook does not want to take sides in the culture wars, 
presumably because doing so would alienate segments of its 
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customer base. After all, Republicans buy shoes from Facebook ads 
too.116 
Of course, there are limits to the extent to which Facebook can 
avoid responsibility for what it allows on its platform. As one 
representative has written, “[t]o be clear, we are not asking a group 
of experts to make decisions for us. We are, however, asking for 
their insights to help inform our thinking and hold us accountable. 
We’ll still be making hard decisions every day, and we accept the 
full weight of that responsibility.”117 Facebook cannot be seen to be 
trying to wash its hands of the problems its platform creates, nor 
does it want to completely renounce control over important content 
decisions that define the user experience. Finding the right balance 
will no doubt involve a degree of ongoing calibration. 
4. Enforcing Existing Standards 
To a limited extent, the FOB might also help not only with 
changing or filling in gaps in Facebook’s policies, but also with 
enforcing the policies that Facebook already has. In any complex 
system, enforcement error is inevitable. As Zuckerberg says in his 
Blueprint, “[t]he vast majority of mistakes we make are due to errors 
enforcing the nuances of our policies rather than disagreements 
about what those policies should actually be.”118 An appeals body 
can be a useful mechanism for monitoring the performance of and 
correcting errors in the application of its existing standards. It has 
the advantage of distributing the burden of finding mistakes by 
making private parties bear the cost of rectifying errors by bringing 
cases. This is how many authoritarian regimes use a system of 
administrative law courts, to resolve principal-agent problems in the 
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administration of their policies that cannot be resolved through 
centralized monitoring alone.119 
Facebook may, for example, be satisfied that it has drawn the 
appropriate line in its definition of hate speech.120 But this highly 
contextual and sensitive judgment call will not always be 
implemented correctly by context-blind AI tools or the burnt-out, 
time-pressured, and geographically-distributed contractors that are 
charged with implementing these rules.121 Currently, it is not 
uncommon for external parties to find such errors and to extract 
apologies from Facebook once they draw public attention to the 
mistakes.122 Creating the FOB formalizes this process and redirects 
the public outrage into a predetermined process for the resolution of 
disputes. This has the added benefit of encouraging engagement 
with the platform and its rules, rather than mere criticism or flight.123 
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This process of engagement keeps users invested in the site and 
creates a kind of buy-in. 
But it is important to be realistic about the extent of this function 
for the FOB: the FOB will only be able to hear and decide appeals 
in the tiniest fraction of content moderation decisions Facebook 
makes. Error correction cannot be its primary goal; it will be a 
collateral benefit only. And the extent to which regulators are 
persuaded to stay their hand and the public no longer blames 
Facebook alone for controversial decisions is dependent on whether 
the FOB itself is seen as legitimate and independent. Legitimacy is 
therefore the crux of the FOB experiment. Before discussing the 
fundamental challenge of creating legitimacy, the next section 
sketches the broad strokes of the FOB’s institutional design. 
III. THE FOB BLUEPRINT 
Many details about the final institutional design of the FOB 
remain unknown at the time of writing.124 Zuckerberg’s Blueprint 
and the later released Draft Charter literally ask more questions than 
they answer. In his blog post, Zuckerberg asked: “how are members 
of the body selected? How do we ensure their independence from 
Facebook, but also their commitment to the principles they must 
uphold? How do people petition this body? How does the body pick 
which cases to hear from potentially millions of requests? “125 As 
one report put it, “[a]ll the major questions remain unanswered.”126 
The Draft Charter starts to fill in some details on the blueprint, but 
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itself acknowledges that it is only a “starting point.”127 Nevertheless, 
these documents do provide a rough picture of what the FOB will 
look like. 
Throughout the development process, one noticeable shift has 
been the abandonment of the comparison of the FOB to the 
“Supreme Court.” This is welcome, and this paper argues that the 
ultimate design should go even further in this direction. Some 
scholars have suggested that the effectiveness of the FOB “will 
depend on the answer to one key question: How much will the 
‘Supreme Court of Facebook’ be like the Supreme Court of the 
United States?”128 Of course, the recourse of commentators and 
Zuckerberg to the analogy of the Supreme Court of the United States 
is not surprising. Facebook is an intrinsically American company, 
and its staff are acculturated in American culture and legal norms.129 
But focusing on a comparison to the U.S. legal system would be an 
unduly narrow view. Facebook is a global company. What’s more, 
since the U.S. Constitution was written, nearly 1,000 different 
constitutional systems have been created from which much has been 
learned.130 Some of the details in the Draft Charter, described below, 
show Facebook is open to these lessons and to institutional 
innovation. 
A. Membership 
Ultimately, the individuals selected for the FOB will be 
enormously consequential for the quality of its decisions and the 
success of the project. But members will be helped or hindered by 
their institutional context. The Draft Charter announces that the 
FOB will be comprised of “up to 40 global experts,” selected on the 
basis of publicly available qualifications as well as geographical, 
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cultural, personal, and professional diversity.131 Deciding the size of 
the board involves a trade-off: a smaller group of members would 
create a greater concentration of expertise and authority, while a 
larger group would be more diverse and possibly able to hear more 
cases. Choosing to have members from varied professional 
backgrounds also shows this preference for diverse perspectives, 
instead of selecting members who would have a common set of 
professional norms and a shared discursive toolbox. 
The choice not to prioritize accumulation of expertise and 
authority will be exacerbated by Board members’ relatively short 
terms—fixed at three years and automatically renewable once, 
subject to removal for violation of terms of their appointment.132 
Compensation will be set in advance and unchangeable.133 The fixed 
tenure and compensation are important—these indicia are “the gold 
standard of independence” and essential to preserve members’ 
independence from Facebook.134 But the short term length does 
undermine this somewhat. Perhaps life tenure (as for U.S. federal 
judges and justices) is not necessary, feasible, or desirable for 
Facebook, but the international norm for judicial office on final 
courts of appeal is terms of around nine to fourteen years.135 The 
choice of a shorter term not only gives members less time to develop 
their understanding of their role and the Facebook content 
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moderation ecosystem, but may also mean FOB members are 
unduly concerned with their career prospects post-service.136 This 
perverse incentive to consider their own interests might be further 
aggravated by the fact that members will only be serving in a part-
time capacity.137 Indeed, this was promoted as a benefit by Noah 
Feldman in an early white paper on the FOB, arguing “[r]eputational 
effects will be important to them. They will be mid-career actors, so 
that they will have other interests and goals alongside their 
Facebook judicial position.”138 While it is true, as Feldman argues, 
that this will reduce pressure to break professional norms and 
engage in attention-seeking behavior, having shorter, part-time 
terms increases the salience of board members’ personal interests 
rather than their institutional responsibility. These concerns might 
be somewhat mitigated by the fact that “individual members’ names 
will not be associated with particular decisions.”139 Granting 
anonymity may protect against pressure to vote in a particular way 
on any given case, and increase the desire to bolster the legitimacy 
of the institution as a whole with respect-worthy decisions. 
Overall, these choices reflect a theme that dominates the Draft 
Charter: the importance of diversity. Indeed, the words “diverse” or 
“diversity” are used six times in two pages.140 The reason for this is 
clear. Facebook has long been criticized for the lack of diversity in 
its leadership, product design, and content moderation teams.141 This 
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has affected the company’s ability to anticipate and understand how 
its platform impacts its diverse global user base. Many of the biggest 
content moderation controversies have involved the harsher 
operation of Facebook’s rules on minorities, for example.142 Greater 
diversity enhances the legitimacy of courts’ decisions in the eyes of 
the public, and especially for those minorities that previously lacked 
representation.143 Facebook has written that “[t]he success and the 
ultimate effectiveness of the Oversight Board will depend on its 
ability to accommodate an inclusive and diverse range of 
perspectives, across language, culture and experience.”144 And in a 
global consultation process on the FOB, “many stressed the need for 
the Board’s composition to reflect as many segments of society as 
possible.”145 
But this may set an impossible target. The FOB cannot 
encompass diversity sufficient to represent the views of a user base 
that is perhaps the most diverse “community” ever assembled. The 
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U.S. Supreme Court has been criticized for failing to reflect the 
diversity of its single-country jurisdiction.146 Consider, then, that the 
FOB’s jurisdiction is not a single country, but spans the globe. One 
report noted that “[c]reating a body that has credibility with the 
extraordinarily wide geographical, cultural, and political range of 
Facebook users would be a major challenge.”147 This is an 
understatement. It is not just that the FOB cannot hope to represent 
every single view, or cannot “include representatives from every 
country and culture.”148 It cannot hope to represent even a 
meaningful fraction of those views. This is especially so given that 
the forty-member FOB will not sit as a whole in each case, but will 
instead hear cases in panels.149 A forty-member body is not even 
large enough to include a representative from each of Africa’s fifty-
four countries. Facebook acknowledges Africa is a “complex 
tapestry of cultures,” but then proceeds to flatten this diversity by 
saying “Africa will be represented on the board alongside other 
regions.”150 There is no reason to believe, for example, that any 
representative from Africa will have the expertise and legitimacy 
necessary to issue authoritative pronouncements on issues as diverse 
as Nigerian fake news151 to Libyan “keyboard warriors” who carry 
out online partisan battles.152 
Rather than pretending that the FOB itself can be sufficiently 
diverse to be representative of Facebook users, the limits of this 
capacity should be factored into the FOB’s design. There is no single 
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body that could represent a community the size and scale of 
Facebook. The FOB will instead need to be empowered to reach out 
to different experts and communities who have relevant perspectives 
to offer in any individual case. Facebook is not wrong that the 
legitimacy and therefore success of the FOB will depend in large 
part on its capacity to bring greater diversity to Facebook’s content 
moderation system, but it will need to find ways to do this other than 
through FOB membership alone. 
B. Power of Review 
The Draft Charter states that the “primary function of the board 
is to review specific decisions we make when enforcing our 
Community Standards.”153 As noted above, this may be the primary 
activity of the FOB, but it cannot be its primary function. Given the 
sheer volume of content moderation decisions that Facebook makes 
every day, the FOB’s impact would be miniscule if its function were 
purely error correction in individual cases. Other aspects of the Draft 
Charter suggest Facebook appreciates this broader purpose. 
Crucially, the FOB’s decisions will be made public and include 
an explanation.154 If the decision of the relevant panel is not 
unanimous, minority views can be included in the explanation for 
the decision.155 This shows that the purpose of the FOB is not only 
to decide outcomes and correct errors, but also to give reasons—to 
expose the reasoning and tensions involved in content moderation 
decisions. 
To guide this process, Facebook will publish a final Charter that 
includes a set of values which the FOB agrees to uphold.156 This 
aims to make the basis for the FOB’s decisions more transparent, 
thereby ensuring “the public legitimacy of the board will grow.”157 
FOB panels should “ensure consistency with other issued 
opinions”158 so that its decisions create a coherent body of “platform 
 
 153 DRAFT CHARTER, supra note 2, at 3. 
 154 Id. at 5. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. 
OCT. 2019] Facebook's Oversight Board 35 
law.”159 This emphasis on consistency and coherence with prior 
decisions invokes notions of stare decisis, the legal doctrine of 
precedent. Given this reliance on a fundamental concept of legal 
training, it is again notable that not all members of the FOB will be 
lawyers. 
Given that reason-giving is central to the FOB’s role, its 
institutional design should be centered around facilitating the 
production of quality decisions. Again, this involves trade-offs, the 
most obvious being speed of decision-making in order to ensure that 
by the time the case is decided there is still the possibility of a 
substantive remedy. If a take-down decision comes too late, the 
damage of a viral post may already be done. The importance of 
speed versus careful consideration may differ in each case, but the 
Draft Charter indicates there will be a hard deadline of two weeks 
for all FOB decisions.160 The difficulty of this rigid timeline is 
indicated by the wide range of activities that the FOB might 
undertake during this time: it will be empowered to “call upon 
experts to ensure it has all supplementary linguistic, cultural and 
sociopolitical expertise necessary to make a decision,”161 and other 
stakeholders will also be able to submit arguments and material to 
the panel.162 This additional, inquisitorial-style evidence gathering 
powers of the FOB are an essential departure from the U.S. Supreme 
Court model. The factual record on which Facebook’s content 
moderators base their decisions is incredibly slim—sometimes it 
does not even include comments or captions that accompany a piece 
of flagged content.163 But correct content moderation decisions 
depend on a proper understanding of context. The same word could 
be a form of artistic expression in one context or a racial slur in 
another. Political, historical, or social context may make a phrase 
that seems innocuous on its face extremely provocative and even 
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dangerous. Proper responses to hate and disinformation depends on 
an understanding of local, or even hyper-local, considerations.164  
Zuckerberg has also acknowledged that the “linguistic nuances” 
involved in identifying hate speech and bullying pose a special 
challenge for both reviewers and AI.165 A civil rights audit found 
that a key reason for errors in Facebook’s moderation of hate speech 
was insufficient attention to context.166 The FOB’s role in 
considering extra context and correcting errors will therefore be 
especially important in these cases. 
In difficult cases, then, the extent of the material necessary for 
the FOB to make a well-informed decision could be vast, or the 
logistics of finding and hearing from necessary experts might be 
challenging. But because of the limitations on the FOB’s ability to 
adequately represent the full diversity of Facebook users, as noted 
above, this expertise-gathering should be given ample space to 
occur. In this context, a two-week deadline seems somewhat 
arbitrary: a functional board would itself determine the correct 
balance in each case. It is unclear why a strict standard of two weeks 
strikes a good balance—a fortnight is an eternity in terms of the 
Internet zeitgeist (justice delayed is virality denied) but perhaps not 
long enough for a multi-member board to gather and consider all the 
materials it needs. 
Another notable departure from the U.S. model is the FOB being 
given a kind of “abstract” jurisdiction.167 Facebook has indicated 
that beyond deciding individual cases, the company “may request 
policy guidance from the board.”168 The U.S. Supreme Court’s 
jurisdiction hinges on the finding of a specific “case or 
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controversy,”169 but an abstract jurisdiction for the FOB will 
empower it to highlight problems in Facebook’s rules in advance of 
individuals bringing appeals about them. This capacity could be 
further enhanced by the creation of a concrete review jurisdiction,170 
where moderators might escalate matters to review in hard cases 
where they are uncertain about how the Community Standards 
should be applied, in advance of a user-initiated appeal. This would 
have the advantage of potentially heading off controversy created 
by moderators being forced to make a decision in hard cases without 
the benefit of full consideration. The power to assess the 
appropriateness of rules and not merely the application of them in a 
particular case is an important one, discussed further below, and 
should be available beyond Facebook’s discretion to refer such 
cases. 
Many questions remain about how, in practice, the FOB will 
exercise these powers of review. Not least among them are 
“standing” rules about who is qualified to bring an appeal (just the 
user who posted the content, for example, or third parties?), the form 
of argumentation (will there be a Facebook bar who argues before 
the FOB in person?), how cases will be selected from the large 
volume of contested decisions, how to support “litigants” to ensure 
that access to the FOB is not limited to the well-resourced, who will 
bear the burden of proof to establish error, what kind of evidence the 
FOB will consider, and innumerable other questions. These 
decisions will impact the FOB’s legitimacy, and many will likely be 
worked out over time. This article is concerned with institutional 
design of the FOB at a higher level of generality, and so these 
questions are set aside for now. But once the FOB is operational, 
these questions will become more urgent and salient in how it is 
perceived. 
C. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 
For the FOB to meaningfully contribute to Facebook’s content 
moderation ecosystem, its subject-matter jurisdiction—that is, the 
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topics on which it is empowered to hear cases—should reflect the 
wide ambit of ways Facebook decides what appears on its platform. 
Two things are worth noting about the subject-matter 
jurisdiction of the FOB. First, the FOB “will not decide cases where 
reversing Facebook’s decision would violate the law.”171 This 
reflects Facebook’s general position that it will respect local laws in 
the countries it operates.172 Facebook follows local laws because 
they “are often the result of public input, even just the indirect 
influence of a democratic election. The laws are therefore likely to 
reflect, at least in democracies, the social values of the local 
population.”173 This restriction on the FOB’s jurisdiction is not 
surprising: indeed, where local law conflicts with Facebook’s rules, 
the FOB would have limited power to mandate that Facebook 
disobey legal requirements. But a consequence of this is that 
governments have de facto control over the FOB’s remit. A 
government can prevent the FOB from giving an opinion on a matter 
if it makes a particular type of content illegal. As Feldman 
acknowledges, “[i]t would be plausible to eliminate this provision 
from the proposal altogether. The idea would be to discourage states 
from enacting laws that limit expression and hence gaining control 
over content on Facebook.”174 This provision also undermines 
Facebook’s professed desire to have a universal set of Community 
Standards. In practice, and particularly in countries where 
governments seek to exercise tight control over public discourse, 
carving out disputes under local law may be a severe limitation. 
National and international laws about free speech and online content 
are proliferating and diverse.175 Even within a single jurisdiction, 
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different courts can come to different conclusions on the meaning of 
relevant laws and whether certain content is illegal.176 
A key anterior question in these cases will be who decides 
whether a take-down decision was taken due to local legal 
requirements or Facebook’s own Community Standards. If 
Facebook itself decides this question, this too undermines the FOB’s 
oversight capacity by giving Facebook a way of deciding that certain 
cases should not reach the FOB. Facebook could determine, without 
the possibility of review, that the FOB cannot hear a particular case. 
This may be exacerbated by the fact that when legal liability is not 
clear, platforms tend to err on the side of caution.177 
The second notable thing about the subject-matter jurisdiction of 
the FOB is its overall narrowness. Apart from possible abstract 
review referrals by Facebook, the FOB is limited to reviewing 
individual applications of Facebook’s Community Standards. The 
biggest controversies around content moderation for Facebook in 
the last few years have concerned its decisions to take down, or not 
take down, putative hate speech,178 foreign interference in domestic 
elections,179 and other forms of misinformation and disinformation 
(including so-called “fake news,”180 “deepfakes” and 
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“cheapfakes”181). But these are not the only important types of 
content moderation decisions Facebook makes. Allowing tech 
companies to frame “content decisions” or “content moderation” in 
such a limited way would get in the way of creating meaningful 
oversight and instead result in a type of transparency theatre. 
As examples, there are at least two other key areas of “content 
decisions” that the FOB should have jurisdiction to adjudicate 
disputes under, both of which would be a more significant 
abdication of authority by the company. The first is algorithmic 
ranking decisions, and in particular the decision to down-rank 
certain content and decrease its circulation. The second is the 
application of its advertising policies, especially those around 
compliance with the additional new requirements Facebook has put 
in place concerning political ads. 
Both of these decisions go much more directly to the core of 
Facebook’s business model than individual content moderation 
decisions about whether user posts comply with the Community 
Standards. The Facebook News Feed algorithm is Facebook’s 
“secret sauce,”182 that drives user engagement. Facebook is 
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notoriously protective of its algorithm,183 and users,184 academics,185 
civil society,186 and lawmakers187 have long been calling for greater 
transparency around how Facebook determines what gets shown in 
the News Feed. Advertising is the backbone of Facebook’s 
business.188 Facebook might be concerned that giving the FOB 
power to review decisions in these domains risks too much 
intervention in the platform’s core product design and revenue 
stream. But denying this jurisdiction undermines any claim that the 
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FOB is a meaningful and bona fide attempt to give greater rigor and 
transparency to Facebook’s content moderation ecosystem as a 
whole. Indeed, confining the scope of jurisdiction of courts is a 
common technique used by authoritarian regimes to undermine the 
check on power that an independent judiciary might otherwise 
provide.189 As Martin Shapiro has observed, “[a] relatively 
independent judiciary may be preserved but simply excluded from 
domains significant to the authoritarian regime.”190 As the rest of this 
section shows, both ranking and advertising decisions are core 
content moderation matters, and a body that is intended to provide 
“oversight” to content decisions needs to be empowered to review 
them. 
A Degree of Algorithmic Transparency 
Often, content moderation conversations revolve around a “take 
down / leave up” dichotomy. But platforms have far greater capacity 
to control the content on their sites than this paradigm suggests. 
Facebook is increasingly relying not on the blunter content 
moderation tools of removing posts or pages, but on the subtler tools 
of limiting their reach and exposure. For “borderline” content in 
each of its harmful categories, Facebook works to “distribute that 
content less” to reduce the incentive to post such content.191 
Zuckerberg argues that “no matter where we draw the lines for what 
is allowed, as a piece of content gets close to that line, people will 
engage with it more on average.”192 But Facebook’s decision to 
“downrank” a piece of content (or distribute it less) in users’ News 
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Feeds is currently much less transparent than a decision to take down 
a piece of content. Users are typically notified when a post is 
removed entirely, but, because users are not told how their posts are 
treated by the News Feed algorithm, may be entirely unaware when 
their post is left up but just not shown to other users. From 
Facebook’s perspective, this is a key virtue of this approach. As the 
company notes in a recent patent for this practice, when it is used 
“the commenting user is not made aware that his or her comment 
was blocked, thereby providing fewer incentives to the commenting 
user to spam the page or attempt to circumvent the social networking 
system filters.”193 
Opacity in Facebook’s ranking decisions leaves users guessing 
at what is happening, and speculating if this is the cause of any drop 
in engagement with their posts. Some (including President Trump) 
have suggested that social media platforms “shadow ban”194 posts 
simply because they do not like them.195 
Crucially, if the FOB cannot review down ranking decisions not 
only will this speculation persist, but also Facebook can still 
effectively control the extent to which the FOB can provide 
oversight: if Facebook does not want a takedown to be subject of 
public attention and the FOB’s review, Facebook could simply 
downrank that content effectively out of circulation instead of 
removing it. 
Facebook’s content moderation includes decisions about how to 
distribute content Facebook does not take down. Therefore, to give 
legitimacy to this wider ecosystem the FOB needs jurisdiction over 
these decisions. Of course, in a sense, every piece of content on 
Facebook is subject to a degree of algorithmic content moderation. 
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Facebook has famously jealously guarded the workings of its News 
Feed algorithm, to prevent user gaming and for trade secrets reasons. 
There may be a legitimate argument that the FOB cannot or should 
not have complete oversight of all aspects of the algorithm; but at 
least to the extent that algorithmic changes are used explicitly as a 
tool of content moderation on the basis of lines drawn in the 
Community Standards, these should be subject to FOB review. 
 
Advertising Policies 
Facebook has detailed policies on advertising and all ads 
purchased undergo pre-publication review to ensure they meet 
Facebook’s rules.196 Facebook has made significant changes to its 
political advertising policies in the wake of controversy surrounding 
the 2016 U.S. election. Advertisers that run political ads are now 
required to go through an authorization process and run disclaimers 
about who paid for the ads.197 Facebook’s definition of a political ad 
includes an ad that relates to any of twenty “issues of national 
importance,” a list that includes, for example, the indeterminate 
category of “values.”198 Facebook’s application of these rules has 
given rise to controversy. Ads from news sites199 and non-profits200 
were removed because they were flagged as “political” but had not 
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received the necessary special authorization, while ads purchased in 
the names of sitting Senators were waved through.201 The individual 
and societal consequences of inconsistent and opaque enforcement 
of political advertising policies are potentially significant. Yet, as 
Kreiss and McGregor found, Facebook “exercise[s] considerable 
discretion over paid political media. While these decisions are 
clearly difficult, they are made without much in the way of 
transparency, consistency, or accountability.”202 The lack of 
explanation for how these policies are applied is particularly 
concerning because without it “Facebook would have the authority 
to determine the messages that campaigns pay for the public to see, 
without the [public] challenges that keep these firms learning and 
cause their policies to evolve.”203 Without transparency, it also opens 
Facebook up to the charge that its decisions are politically 
motivated. 
Inconsistent and unexplained decision-making is exactly the 
problem the FOB is being created to solve. In the context of political 
content, this is especially important. The mere fact that content is 
paid and not “organic” does not alleviate the need for oversight. 
Giving the FOB’s jurisdiction in these cases would put literal money 
where Facebook’s mouth is about trusting the expertise of the FOB 
to interpret and apply its rules in a legitimate manner. 
In the report summarizing the results of its global consultation 
on the FOB, Facebook said that it had been “clear” that the Board 
was only going to review individual decisions under the Community 
Standards and that while News Feed ranking and political 
advertising were “important issues,” they were beyond the remit of 
the Board.204 But these are not just important issues: they are at the 
core of Facebook’s content moderation ecosystem. Excluding them 
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from the FOB’s jurisdiction undermines Facebook’s broader 
commitment to transparency and accountability in content 
moderation that the FOB is intended to facilitate. 
IV. THE LEGITIMACY CONUNDRUM 
The fundamental purpose of the FOB is to bring greater 
legitimacy to Facebook’s content moderation ecosystem. While 
enhancing the legitimacy of the FOB itself is instrumental to this 
goal, it is not the ultimate aim: the aim is to legitimize Facebook’s 
exercise of power by subjecting it to an independent check. The 
focus of this article is therefore a more general sociological 
legitimacy—that is, the extent to which the public regards 
Facebook’s decisions generally as justified, appropriate, or 
otherwise deserving of support beyond the fear of sanctions or mere 
hope for personal reward.205 
In a crucial sense, this legitimacy can only be established over 
time. For the FOB itself, as the Draft Charter notes, “[t]he public 
legitimacy of the board will grow from the transparent, independent 
decisions that the board makes.”206 But gaining legitimacy will be 
difficult. The FOB is being established in response to widespread 
public dissatisfaction with Facebook content moderation and so the 
enterprise begins on the back foot. And while the early use of the 
moniker of a “Supreme Court” may have been (intentionally or 
unintentionally) intended to invoke the aura of legitimacy that the 
Supreme Court of the United States enjoys, the FOB will not have a 
reservoir of legitimacy accumulated over a long history to draw 
down upon.207 
But there are two more fundamental challenges in the quest for 
legitimacy: first, the difficulty for Facebook making a credible 
commitment to being bound by the FOB when, ultimately, 
Facebook itself retains final authority; and second, the lack of 
agreed prior norms or authorities for content moderation which the 
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FOB can base its decisions on and leverage into accepted 
pronouncements. This part addresses each of these challenges in 
turn. 
A. The Limits of the FOB’s Legitimizing Power 
There is a real limit on the extent of the legitimation that the 
FOB can bring to Facebook content moderation. Part II(B) above 
discussed the ways in which authoritarian regimes use courts to give 
them a veneer of legitimacy. But as Mark Tushnet has pointed out 
about this literature, “[t]he general difficulty with these accounts is 
straightforward: rulers might want to make credible commitments, 
but they cannot do so, precisely because they can alter the 
constitution whenever they want—and the target audiences know 
that these rulers can do so.”208 In Facebook’s case, the conundrum is 
the same: Zuckerberg wants to assure stakeholders that the FOB will 
be independent, make decisions “in the best interests of our 
community and not for commercial reasons,”209 and that Facebook 
will consider itself bound by the FOB’s decisions. But it is difficult 
for Facebook to make this commitment to tie itself to the mast of the 
FOB completely credible. Ultimately, Facebook does not have to 
obey the FOB’s decisions or could disband the institution altogether 
without cause. This is the flip side of judicial review being a 
relatively low-cost way of enhancing legitimacy without opening up 
the broader policy-making process—you get what you pay for. 
A practical issue may also arise for Facebook of how to resolve 
its fiduciary duties to its shareholders should the FOB issue a 
decision that it genuinely regarded as against its commercial 
interests.210 The simple response is that the FOB can be considered 
in the long-term commercial interests of the company because it 
increases user satisfaction, protects company reputation, and 
potentially staves off more severe regulation. But to the extent that 
this is true, the FOB does not actually constitute a “check” on 
Facebook’s power because its actions remain in Facebook’s best 
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interests. As Tushnet explains, when it serves the interest of the 
authoritarian for there to be an external check on its powers: 
[C]ourts do no work because the regime’s immediate self-interest will 
lead it to refrain from actions that reduce the returns it anticipates to gain 
during the period when the preferences are stable. And, if the regime’s 
preferences change, the mechanisms also do no work because the regime 
is free to change them to accommodate its new preferences.211  
Similarly, should Facebook decide that the cost of public 
legitimacy becomes too high, it can simply abandon its 
experiment.212 
The notion that the FOB is merely instrumental to Facebook and 
does not constitute a meaningful check is further suggested by a 
number of design choices. The highly circumscribed and subjective 
nature of the FOB’s subject-matter jurisdiction, discussed above,213 
is the most significant. But there is also the fact that Facebook has 
said that the company “can incorporate the board’s decisions in the 
policy development process,”214 suggesting that this possibility is 
discretionary. There is a fundamental tension for Facebook in 
creating a meaningfully independent body while also keeping its 
discretion within acceptable bounds. As Zuckerberg asked, “[h]ow 
do we ensure their independence from Facebook, but also their 
commitment to the principles they must uphold?”215 Facebook’s 
answer to this has been to require FOB members to agree to uphold 
a set of values specified by Facebook.216 
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B. The Limits of a “Constitution’s” Legitimizing Power 
Requiring the FOB’s decisions to be based on a set of underlying 
values has been likened to the adoption of a “constitution” which 
will guide the FOB’s interpretation of the Community Standards.217 
These values will play an important role in the FOB’s work, but 
there are crucial ways in which they are unlike a constitution. A 
values statement can perform the same role as constitutions do in 
expressing Facebook’s fundamental vision for its platform which 
the FOB can use to resolve ambiguity in the Community Standards 
in a way that reflects these commitments. But because the values 
will be Facebook’s and not the user community’s, they cannot 
perform the same role of legitimization that constitutions do because 
there is no sense in which the values express a delegation of 
authority from users or a set of widely-agreed norms. 
The statement of values will play an essential role by guiding the 
FOB in difficult cases where there is no clear answer. It is precisely 
because there will be instances where competing understandings of 
the Community Standards are possible that the FOB is necessary. If 
the Community Standards provided a clear answer in every case, 
there would be no need to seek review of content moderation 
decisions. In cases where there are multiple possible interpretations 
of these rules, what should the FOB use to decide between them? 
Without a set of underlying values, decisions become relatively 
unconstrained. This is suboptimal from Facebook’s perspective, 
because it creates a large sphere of discretion for FOB members. But 
it is also suboptimal for users and for the legitimacy of the FOB 
itself: without an underlying set of commitments, decisions can 
become unpredictable or seen as arbitrary. 
In its Draft Charter, Facebook said it would adopt a set of values 
that “would encompass concepts like voice, safety, equity, dignity, 
equality and privacy.”218 Importantly, a list of vague “values” does 
not help achieve the aim of guiding the FOB’s interpretative 
practice. A list that includes everything prioritizes nothing. It is hard 
to disagree with the importance of each of “voice, safety, equity, 
dignity, equality and privacy,” but the very nature of hard freedom 
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of speech cases is that they involve trade-offs between these values. 
The difference between various countries’ hate speech 
jurisprudence, for example, is largely due to a different weighting of 
these values. As Rosenfeld explains: 
If free speech in the United States is shaped above all by individualism 
and libertarianism, collective concerns and other values such as honor 
and dignity lie at the heart of the conceptions of free speech that originate 
in international covenants or in the constitutional jurisprudence of other 
Western democracies. Thus, for example, Canadian constitutional 
jurisprudence is more concerned with multiculturalism and group-
regarding equality. For its part, the German Constitution sets the 
inviolability of human dignity as its paramount value. . . . These 
differences have had a profound impact on the treatment of hate 
speech.219 
Albie Sachs has similarly observed: 
To Americans, the firstness of the First Amendment is axiomatic. It is 
seen as a source of enlightenment, as being the most constitutive and 
defining element of the whole constitutional order. The legal cultures of 
Germany and South Africa, however, have a profoundly different 
foundational element. It is not free speech, but human dignity. What is 
axiomatic to an American lawyer could be problematic to us. What is 
axiomatic to us could be problematic to an American.220 
Just as AI cannot perform content moderation without coders 
making value judgments in writing the algorithms,221 so too 
Facebook cannot escape the need to make a choice about the kind of 
platform it wants to be. The decision of whether to allow conspiracy-
mongerer Alex Jones to continue to stream and share violent and 
sometimes racist conspiracy theories is an example where such a 
choice is necessary.222 On one side is the value of voice and liberty 
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to speak, but on the other hand there is the safety and dignity of 
people affected by his hateful rhetoric or conspiracy-mongering. 
Another example is the decision to prohibit content promoting 
eating disorders, which reflects a prioritization of safety over 
unconstrained voice.223 These choices are controversial—this is part 
of the reason the FOB is being set up. But an uncontroversial 
statement of values that is universally acceptable would be stated at 
such a level of generality to be of limited utility in constraining 
decision-making. 
Zuckerberg has in fact long articulated underlying values he sees 
as inherent in his platform. In the opening words of his Blueprint 
announcing the FOB’s creation he says “[m]any of us got into 
technology because we believe it can be a democratizing force for 
putting power in people’s hands. I’ve always cared about this and 
that’s why the first words of our mission have always been “give 
people the power.”224 This kind of rhetoric attracts backlash, but a 
transparent statement of what the platform is intended to be is 
important in explaining choices made in content moderation. And 
by explicitly choosing priorities in advance, this reduces the chances 
that the FOB’s decision-making becomes so out of step with the 
company’s vision for its platform that it decides to simply ignore or 
overrule its decisions. 
But although a charter that makes difficult choices will be 
necessary for the FOB to function effectively, it cannot cure 
Facebook’s legitimacy deficits for several reasons. First, as 
discussed, there is no mechanism to double-entrench any 
“constitution” such that Facebook could not amend it at-will, 
making it difficult to place too much faith in its power. Second, the 
constitution itself will not have sociological legitimacy and so users 
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have no special reason to accept decisions made ostensibly in 
accordance with it. A list of human rights buzzwords released by 
Facebook or chosen by Zuckerberg will not have the same resonance 
as national constitutions that are typically adopted through 
democratic processes. Although Zuckerberg seems to have been 
reading some Rawls,225 he is more founder than founding father and 
has little mandate to decide the values of the entire community of 
Facebook users. A choice by him to prioritize “voice” over 
“dignity,” for example, might resonate with some users but cannot 
be said to be reflective of the will of those users in any real sense 
nor will those that disagree have much reason to feel themselves 
reasonably beholden to Zuckerberg’s choice. 
Facebook could, and many have argued should,226 adopt other 
widely endorsed norms such as international human rights law as 
the basis of its decisions. Facebook itself has said it looks to 
documents like the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights for guidance on where to draw the lines on freedom of 
expression.227 There are some potential limitations with adopting 
these norms wholesale,228 but they could provide a starting point on 
which to develop a more mature form of content moderation. 
International human rights law has the advantage of having a 
significant reservoir of legitimacy in certain communities which 
Facebook and the FOB could draw down on. Many scholars are 
doing important work on this topic, but it is not explored any further 
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here for the simple reason that at this stage Facebook is showing no 
indication that it intends for international human rights law to be the 
fundamental basis for its content moderation. 
Therefore, a fundamental set of values is a necessary but not 
sufficient part of creating legitimacy for Facebook’s content 
moderation and the FOB’s decisions. Affirmatively stating what the 
purpose of content moderation on Facebook is can guide the FOB’s 
interpretative process, but it cannot of itself compel those who had 
no say in deciding those values to view them as legitimate. 
V. MAXIMIZING THE FOB’S POTENTIAL 
The FOB can still bring significant benefits to Facebook’s 
content moderation despite these limits on the legitimacy it can 
create. Maximizing these benefits requires acknowledging these 
limitations and designing around them. This includes accepting two 
facts inherent in the problem of content moderation on private 
platforms: Facebook will always retain the power to overrule the 
FOB’s decisions, and in many of the most difficult cases there will 
be no “right” answer. Institutional design that accounts for these 
facts will be stronger in the long run. It should focus on the two key 
benefits that the FOB can bring. First, a practical benefit: a judicial-
style check, even if reversable by Facebook, can improve 
Facebook’s policy formation processes. Second, a sociological 
benefit: bringing greater public acceptance of Facebook’s rules 
through the performance of public reasoning.229 
A. Weakness as Strength 
The FOB can improve Facebook’s policies without being the 
ultimate authority on every aspect of the platform’s rules. The idea 
that the FOB’s review of Facebook’s decisions should be final and 
irreversible, not only in the particular case but in all similar cases 
going forward, is a fundamentally American perspective. Indeed, 
this is known as strong-form judicial review, and the Supreme Court 
of the United States is considered the “archetype or paradigm” of 
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this practice.230 Tushnet, the leading writer on the strong-form/weak-
form distinction, describes the strong-form model in the following 
way: “[i]n systems with strong-form judicial review, of which the 
United States is usually taken to be representative, the constitutional 
court has the power to invalidate primary legislation, and legislative 
responses to such invalidations are made quite difficult.”231 
By contrast, the central characteristic of weak-form review is 
that “courts assess legislation against constitutional norms, but do 
not have the final word on whether statutes comply with those 
norms” and judicial interpretation can be displaced by ordinary 
legislative processes.232 Commentators have suggested that this kind 
of override would undermine the FOB’s independence. Kadri has 
argued that “[i]f Facebook is free to unilaterally overrule appellate 
decisions it doesn’t like, the talk of a new era of radical transparency 
and accountability will be overblown. . . . [A]mending its legal code 
willy-nilly would undermine the entire project.”233 But the 
comparative literature on “weak-form” or “dialogic” review 
suggests this may be too simplistic. There are many benefits of a 
weak-form model of review that may make it more appropriate for 
the dynamic and complex environment that is Facebook. 
1. The Benefits of a Judicial-Style Check on Policy-Making 
Weak-form review is well-suited to counter blockages in the 
“legislative process” (here, the formulation of Community 
Standards).234 Dixon describes two forms of blockages: blind spots 
and inertia. Both are present in Facebook’s policy formation. 
Blind spots arise because initial policies are often written in 
time-pressured conditions, and cannot fully anticipate all the 
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possible circumstances in which a policy will need to be applied.235 
This well describes the process for the formulation of Community 
Standards at Facebook. Initial rules were written haphazardly as 
international expansion meant the platform needed to accommodate 
a rapidly growing and changing user base, and revisions have often 
been prompted by particular high-profile controversies.236 As 
Klonick has observed, “internal policies and the rules that reflect 
them are constantly being updated . . . because Facebook is 
attempting, in large part, to rapidly reflect the norms and 
expectations of its users.”237 A recent Oxford-Stanford report 
highlighted that “Facebook’s policy changes and priorities are often 
highly reactive to outrage and scandal in the relatively narrow 
spectrum of Western media and politics.”238 This description of the 
reactive nature of Facebook’s policy-making parallels the 
description given by Calabresi of the typical legislative process, who 
notes that blind spots can arise because “[l]egislatures often act 
hastily or thoughtlessly with respect to fundamental rights because 
of panic or crises or because, more often, they are simply pressed 
for time.”239 Judicial-style checks help overcome blind spots, 
because they consider the application of rules retrospectively and in 
the context of particular cases.240 The FOB can take into account 
perspectives that initial policy-makers did not have available to 
them or provide an opportunity to review unintended consequences 
of a rule’s operation in practice. 
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Inertia arises where policy-makers do not have the time to 
devote to changing rules that are already in effect or because the 
status quo will often prevail in hard cases when there are 
disagreements about what should be done.241 This can be seen in the 
history of content moderation on Facebook too. For example, the 
status quo of leaving up Alex Jones’ posts prevailed until the 
company was forced to reconsider because other platforms decided 
to remove him.242 The FOB can create a more formalized process for 
prompting Facebook to address blockages. The process of review 
can disrupt the status quo, draw public and Facebook’s attention to 
blind spots or inertia, and provide an opportunity for Facebook to 
correct any error.243 
This form of check also capitalizes on various actors’ 
specializations.244 FOB members will have expertise in “content, 
privacy, free expression, human rights, journalism, civil rights, 
safety and other relevant disciplines.”245 But Facebook staff will 
have better understanding of the overall dynamics of speech on 
Facebook and the surrounding platform architecture. A FOB 
empowered with a weak-form judicial review mandate can create an 
ecosystem that puts these two kinds of expertise in “dialogue.” 
The FOB does not need to have ultimate authority over 
Facebook’s rules to bring these benefits. First, even without such 
authority, Facebook overruling the FOB is likely to be rare. In 
practice, there would be high reputational costs for Facebook in 
disregarding a decision of the FOB. Because Facebook has been 
publicizing the FOB and extolling its benefits, there would likely be 
significant attention given to any substantial undermining of its 
authority, so Facebook is unlikely to take the decision lightly. If 
done often, it would give rise to the impression that the FOB is mere 
window-dressing and deprive it of all legitimacy. Furthermore, it is 
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important to remember that a key benefit of the FOB from 
Facebook’s perspective is not the substantive rulings the FOB issues 
but the ability this gives Facebook to distance itself from 
controversial decisions. This incentive remains even where 
Facebook could overturn any decisions. The similar desire to blame 
courts for unpopular decisions means that in systems with weak-
form review (such as the U.K.) political actors often use rhetoric that 
suggests they consider themselves bound by court decisions in order 
to pass the political buck.246 Therefore the practical strength of 
weak-form review is often much stronger than it appears in theory. 
As Feldman wrote in his original argument for a FOB, “As a 
corporation, [Facebook] has the right and capacity to change its 
policy at any time or even ignore it. The public understands this, as 
it should. . . . [But] [i]f Facebook were to violate its commitment, it 
would be subject to public censure and criticism.”247 
Additionally, in cases where Facebook does decide to overrule 
the FOB, it is likely to issue an explanation given the public attention 
that would surround the move. This reason-giving is also valuable, 
and not only as an improvement over the current (lack of) 
transparency that attends many changes in Facebook’s policies. 
Explaining why Facebook took a different path to the one 
recommended by the FOB could improve the quality of debate 
around Facebook’s rules more generally. Currently, contentious 
content decisions are made in ways that do not facilitate productive 
discussion, such as executives deciding matters in the early hours of 
the morning based on media reports of what other tech companies 
are doing.248 Introducing a judicial-style body into a system can 
elevate the mode of decision-making and discourse, “engender[ing] 
new modes of legislative discourse and practice.”249 Mattias Kumm 
 
 246 Kavanagh, supra note 230, at 1022, 1027. 
 247 Harris, supra note 138, at 140. 
 248 Roose, supra note 242. 
 249 STONE SWEET, supra note 8, at 62, 74–75; Juliane Kokott & Martin Kaspar, 
Ensuring Constitutional Efficacy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 806 (2012). 
58 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 21: 1 
calls this “Socratic Constestation.”250 By putting decision-makers in 
dialogue with a judicial-style check, they begin to think about how 
their decisions can be justified in terms that are more publicly 
acceptable. 
2. The Advantages of Weak-Form Review 
The last section addressed the reasons why weak-form review 
will in most cases be sufficient to bring about the benefits of an 
oversight body. But there are also reasons why this model might in 
fact be preferable to strong-form review. This section addresses five 
reasons: two theoretical, and three pragmatic. Although less august, 
the pragmatic considerations may ultimately be more important. 
First, weak-form review is more appropriate in cases that 
involve competing rights claims. Some proponents for judicial 
review acknowledge that strong-form review might be less 
appropriate when the judicial body will frequently have to decide 
zero-sum controversies involving the collision of two fundamental 
rights.251 This is because such cases involve difficult trade-offs that 
are better left to a branch of government that is more democratically 
accountable or responsive. The speech disputes that the FOB will be 
charged with deciding, such as whether hate speech or sexually 
explicit materials should be taken down, are “common and readily 
expressible as ‘zero sum’ situations.”252 These are archetypal clashes 
between liberty rights (to speak) and dignity or equality rights (for 
example, to be free from harassment). While Facebook itself is not 
democratically accountable like a legislature, it may still be more 
responsive to public pressure than a purposefully insulated FOB. 
Importantly, Facebook is also able to take proactive action in 
response to such pressure in the event that rules or FOB rulings 
become out of step with community values, rather than the FOB 
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which will only make rulings in response to cases brought to it and 
not on its own initiative. 
Second, because these cases involve such difficult trade-offs, 
where ultimately one person’s right or interest must give way to 
another’s, it is important to keep in mind the fragile legitimacy of 
the FOB itself. In such cases, the lack of a reservoir of goodwill on 
which to draw on to bolster decisions that are controversial and will 
upset large segments of the user base will be particularly noticeable. 
This is especially so given, as discussed above, the FOB’s inability 
to be truly or comprehensively representative.253 This means that it 
will necessarily be making decisions to trade-off the rights or 
interests of people who will not feel they are represented in the 
decision-making process. While this can be somewhat mitigated by 
creating processes through which these communities are given a 
voice in proceedings, it will never be wholly resolvable. As such, it 
is better to be humble and not overstate the capacity of the FOB to 
be the final arbiter of norms for all of Facebook’s diverse 
community and allow for feedback and development. 
Third, and this is the critical pragmatic point, if the FOB’s 
decisions are not seen as final and irrevocable, this may make 
Facebook more willing to give the FOB the broader jurisdiction that, 
as argued above, is necessary for it to have meaningful oversight of 
Facebook’s content moderation as a whole. A narrowly confined 
and manipulatable jurisdiction will significantly impair the FOB’s 
value. This is perhaps the single biggest threat to the FOB’s 
legitimacy because it creates the impression that Facebook is only 
willing to renounce power in areas that do not “really matter” to it. 
However, it is also understandable that Facebook may not want to 
completely renounce power over this central aspect of its platform. 
Facebook’s content moderation is in many ways its distinctive value 
offering.254 Facebook’s right to determine the content that appears 
on its platform may also be expressed in terms of the “free speech” 
rights of platforms themselves.255 Weak-form review may be a 
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concession to this consideration, but also to encourage the benefits 
of dialogue between Facebook, the FOB, and stakeholders over a 
broader range of areas. This includes the FOB’s ability to influence 
policy and not just rule on specific take-downs. This kind of abstract 
review jurisdiction is common in countries with specialized 
constitutional courts.256 This is because these courts were created, 
“explicitly and as a constitutional priority, to protect rights” and 
limiting the avenues to access judicial review would produce gaps 
in rights protection.257 And even in the U.S. there is a partial 
exception to the concrete case or controversy requirement for First 
Amendment challenges brought against laws for being vague or 
overbroad, given the potential chilling effect of such legislation.258 
This is a recognition of not making the ability to bring challenges to 
speech rules too narrow or difficult. Therefore, a generally broad 
jurisdiction, including the ability to bring abstract review cases, is 
critical. Facebook is more likely to create this jurisdiction and make 
use of it more often if it retains the option to overrule decisions, this 
is a reasonable compromise. As Stone Sweet says of the 
constitutional courts of Europe that are more politicized but also 
more actively engaged in the protection of rights, “[t]he erosion of 
traditional separation of powers notions is the tax we pay for these 
benefits [of greater rights protection].”259 
Fourth, a concession to realism: should the FOB make a ruling 
that is fundamentally damaging to Facebook or out-of-step with user 
values, Facebook is likely to step in and overrule it. Indeed, it may 
even have a duty to its shareholders to do so.260 It is better to accept 
this reality from the outset, instead of creating a system that will 
only be undermined.261 This pragmatism will create a more robust 
and durable institution in the long run. 
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Finally, weak-form review is more suitable to the nature of the 
online speech ecosystem. Facebook is one part of a rapidly 
expanding and dynamic global information environment, where 
norms of communication are changing on screens before our eyes 
and global society is still reckoning with the consequences of the 
hyperconnected information glut of the modern era. Weak-form 
review better facilitates the capacity to evolve and revise. Indeed, it 
seems the only realistic course. Entrenching decisions or making it 
too costly to take into account ongoing changes would cause FOB 
decisions to endure past their relevance. As Kadri acknowledges, 
“it’s true that Facebook has good reason to want some flexibility to 
alter its speech policies, as it constantly learns and adapts to tackle 
the Sisyphean task of satisfying a ‘community’ of more than 2 
billion people. Binding itself to a 2018 version of its rules will surely 
be untenable.”262 This is a fundamental point that needs to inform 
the entire thinking around institutions responsible with developing 
norms for online speech. There is still so much unknown about the 
new online speech environment, and further research to be done. 
Despite their dominance, these platforms are still a relatively young 
phenomenon. Platform rules should be able to be informed by new 
revelations. Facebook’s recent “shift” to privacy,263 for example, 
shows how both platforms and users can rethink their fundamental 
priorities and values as the ramifications of the new online speech 
ecosystem become apparent. Governance structures need to be able 
to facilitate and respond to these developments. 
Of course, the FOB can and should itself revise its decisions by 
distinguishing or updating precedent on the basis of changed 
circumstances, new evidence, or developing norms. But this is an 
inadequate solution because the FOB cannot update decisions 
proactively—a review body is necessarily responsive to claims and 
disputes brought to it. One example is the updates Facebook made 
to its approach to violent extremism in light of the Christchurch 
shooting. Facebook’s policies were being updated by the day in light 
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of its experience trying to stop the spread of a live video of the 
attack.264 It is now experimenting with audio-based technology to 
identify designated videos, as well as sharing URLs with other 
members of industry.265 Facebook has also revised its response to 
“white nationalism” and “white separatism” as part of its 
acknowledgment that it needs “to get better and faster at finding and 
removing hate from [its] platforms.”266 Facebook will begin 
removing such content, and also start directing people who post it to 
a nonprofit dedicated to helping people leave hate groups.267 Before 
these changes, Facebook did not prohibit this kind of content on the 
grounds that concepts of nationalism and separatism are “an 
important part of people’s identity.”268 These are difficult issues, and 
some people may argue that Facebook made the wrong call and such 
speech should not be censored.269 But the Christchurch shooting 
made clear the large number of people interested in spreading this 
kind of content, and in a way that circumvents normal platform 
rules.270 As the President of Microsoft acknowledged, “it’s clear that 
we need to learn from and take new action based on what happened 
in Christchurch.”271 Events such as these can help inform long-
standing debates about the merits of censorship versus counter-
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speech, which need to evolve to take account of the new empirical 
realities of how speech works online.272 
FOB decisions should not stand in the way of such evolutions. 
It is easy to imagine a situation where the FOB had issued a ruling 
in different circumstances that would constrain Facebook’s response 
to the Christchurch shooting: for example, a holding that sharing a 
URL could never be “hate speech” under the Community Standards, 
or that the value of “voice” prevented Facebook from censoring 
URL sharing. Or there may be cases where the FOB issues a 
decision based on an understanding of how content such as hate 
speech works in the offline world, which is subsequently shown to 
not hold in the online ecosystem. As Scanlon urges, because rights 
contain “a significant empirical component, our understanding of a 
right can always be upset by evidence that forces a change in these 
empirical beliefs.”273 Again, such FOB decisions do not become 
worthless when Facebook seeks to reverse them—they will force a 
public dialogue about why Facebook is changing its rules or 
priorities. 
There are many other examples of assumptions or norms that 
have been displaced or proven false as more is learned about speech 
online. Researchers have been updating their findings on whether 
there is a so-called “backfire effect” to labelling something as 
untrue.274 This has important ramifications for the best way to treat 
misinformation, an issue which platforms have been grappling with 
since the “fake news” scandals of 2016. Early findings about 
whether platforms increase “echo chambers” is also being 
disputed.275 Facebook can, and should, do much more to facilitate 
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this kind of research by being more open with its data.276 But the 
company should not then be handicapped in its capacity to act on 
new findings. 
It is the strong-form nature of review in the U.S. that has lead 
scholars such as Tim Wu to argue that First Amendment 
jurisprudence has been made irrelevant by the changes technology 
has wrought to the speech environment.277 Changing First 
Amendment jurisprudence is a heavy lift, precisely because of the 
difficulty of amending the U.S. Constitution or overturning Supreme 
Court decisions. Given how much is still unknown about online 
speech, and how this impacts offline lives, humility about the 
finality of the FOB’s decisions is warranted. 
3. A Check on Users Too 
The protection of minorities, however, is one area in which the 
ossification of rights could actually be a significant benefit. Courts 
are generally an important mechanism for the protection of minority 
rights. This is one of the key reasons why courts are insulated from 
ordinary political processes, so that they are not constrained from 
playing this counter-majoritarian role in necessary cases. Indeed, 
Dworkin argued that the essence of constitutionalism is “the theory 
that the majority must be restrained to protect individual rights.”278 
Such issues often arise in the context of content moderation, where 
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about concerns for the rights of minorities.279 As the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression has noted, “[t]he vagueness 
of hate speech and harassment policies has triggered complaints of 
inconsistent policy enforcement that penalizes minorities while 
reinforcing the status of dominant or powerful groups.”280 The FOB 
could have an especially important role in protecting the speech of 
those who are otherwise likely to be drowned out on the platform or 
who are underrepresented in the communities of engineers and 
content moderators who control speech on Facebook. 
Zuckerberg writes in his Blueprint that “[j]ust as our board of 
directors is accountable to our shareholders, [the FOB] would be 
focused only on our community.”281 He is right to distinguish 
between focus on the user community and accountability to it. While 
it is important that the FOB works to further the welfare of users (as 
distinguished from the welfare of Facebook as a company), this is 
not the same thing as making decisions that simply reflect user 
preferences. Indeed, “[a]n independent judiciary does not take a poll 
before rendering its decisions.”282 But there is the possibility that the 
FOB’s protective role is undermined through weak-form review if 
Facebook simply has the capacity to overrule FOB decisions that are 
unpopular with majorities. However, this risk does not outweigh the 
potential benefit of weak-form review, and the need for content 
moderation rules to be able to be dynamically updated. It is true that 
there is little to guard against Facebook overruling the FOB in the 
name of majoritarianism beyond Facebook’s good faith 
implementation of the FOB’s independent oversight and a 
commitment to “rule of law” style principles such that it will not 
overturn decisions simply on the basis that they are unpopular. But, 
as argued above, the very fact that content moderation decisions are 
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controversial and will tend to upset significant portions of users is 
part of the reason Facebook is setting the FOB up. This desire to 
outsource controversy suggests that mere unpopularity of a decision 
would not be a reason for Facebook to intervene because then it 
would be undermining its own project to distance itself from the 
controversies. In this sense, the lack of democratic accountability or 
elections of Facebook’s management could provide further 
protection from simple majoritarianism. 
B. Public Reasoning 
Public reason-giving is the defining characteristic of the FOB. 
Facebook already has internal teams that continually review content 
moderation standards and consult outside experts.283 The utility of 
the FOB is not merely in having experts review Facebook’s 
decisions and coming to a “right” outcome. If it were, the internal 
processes would be sufficient. Instead, the FOB is intended to serve 
a function separate and additional to having experts weigh in on 
Facebook’s rules. The core value offering of the FOB is the issuing 
of public explanations for rulings. 284 As Noah Feldman wrote in his 
original white paper proposing the FOB: 
The advantage enjoyed by real-life constitutional courts is that they 
openly address difficult cases, and so derive credit and legitimacy from 
being principled. They make mistakes, and correct them. Their rules 
evolve with changing technology and ideas. And instead of blaming 
them for this, we mostly validate their efforts. . . . Right now, the 
platforms are already doing plenty of balancing work. But they aren’t 
doing it transparently or in a legal-logical way. Changes are greeted with 
outrage rather than respectful engagement. All that could change if the 
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platforms provided a forum for argument, openly considered opposing 
views, and announced the reasoning behind their decisions on a case-by-
case basis.285 
1. The Purpose of Public Reasons 
What exactly, then, is the purpose of public reasoning? An 
obvious answer might be that in an individual case adequate reasons 
are an incident of due process and fairness, by allowing a user to 
know the reasons for a decision (especially an adverse one) 
involving their freedom of expression on the platform.286 This is why 
many common law jurisdictions have a judicial duty to give reasons 
as an incident of due process287 and all constitutional courts of 
Europe are obliged to give reasons for their decisions.288 This is also 
why the Santa Clara Principles, a set of minimum requirements for 
transparency and accountability for content moderation proposed by 
a group of leading civil society organizations, academics, and 
experts, requires that users be given “a statement of reasoning 
sufficient to allow the user to understand the decision.”289 But, as has 
been noted repeatedly throughout this article, the due process 
offerings of the FOB will be limited due to the small fraction of 
cases it will adjudicate. Furthermore, affected users could be given 
reasons without them being made public, which would also diminish 
privacy concerns in releasing public opinions. Therefore, there must 
be other, more general, rationales for public reason-giving. 
As a practical matter, giving reasons assists in creating a 
consistent body of case law by allowing the FOB and users to 
understand the basis on which a particular decision is made and 
distinguish or apply it in future cases. Stone Sweet describes giving 
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defensible reasons that are accepted as a precedential interpretation 
of constitutional meaning as “necessary conditions for the 
emergence of effective review systems.”290 But, reasons do not need 
to be available to the public-at-large for moderators to apply them. 
So, the goal of reason-giving is still more general than that. 
Fundamentally, the FOB is a response to calls for decisional 
transparency and a “global dialogue” with users and stakeholders 
about the impacts and justifications of Facebook’s rules.291 
Platforms generally have been increasingly criticized as having 
opaque decision-making that interferes with their obligations of 
clarity, specificity, and predictability.292 Public reasoning, then, is 
about facilitating this dialogue and legitimizing Facebook’s exercise 
of power over its users. As Rawls argued, in a pluralistic society 
where there will always be disagreement about what rule is best, the 
exercise of power over those who disagree with decisions is only 
legitimized through public reasoning that proceeds in a way people 
might be expected to respect.293 Fallon notes that when decision-
makers rely on reasons that reasonable people would acknowledge 
as fair (and not, for example, idiosyncratic or partisan), this creates 
legitimacy even if people might reach different ultimate 
judgments.294 Therefore, the goal is emphatically not to create 
collective agreement, but to allow for reasoned disagreement. Tom 
Tyler’s research has shown that people’s judgments of legitimacy 
do not depend primarily on their obtaining favorable outcomes, but 
are more strongly influenced by the processes and procedures 
authorities use, including whether they afford participation, 
demonstrate impartiality, and show respect for people’s interests as 
worthy of consideration.295 Therefore, public reasoning is crucial to 
the FOB’s central goal of creating legitimacy for Facebook’s rules. 
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Until now, Facebook has exercised substantial power over not 
only individual speech, but entire societies’ public discourse, while 
giving little justification for the way in which it does so. The FOB 
is a step towards changing this. Just as constitutional courts can 
provide “a focal point for a new rhetoric of state legitimacy” during 
democratic transitions,296 so too might the FOB provide a forum for 
working through the principles in this new era of online governance. 
Two opposing examples are illustrative of the benefits of public 
reasoning. In the first example, a lack of public reasoning 
delegitimized a decision even for those that agreed with it. In the 
second, reasoning helped the affected user come to accept a decision 
they still thought was wrong. 
The first example is the controversy over Alex Jones’ presence 
on Facebook. Leaked emails show the difficulty internal executives 
were having deciding whether a particular post violated Facebook’s 
Community Standards.297 In one email, an executive referred to the 
fact that the number of comments on the post that violated the 
Community Standards “did not meet the threshold for deletion.”298 
UK executives then pointed out local context, noting that the image 
is famous in the UK and “widely acknowledged to be anti-Semitic” 
there, justifying deletion.299 These are the kinds of arguments the 
FOB could help ventilate. The “threshold” referred to is not defined 
in any public document. Whether or not this is a legitimate way of 
determining whether content should be removed, the fact that it is 
applied in a non-transparent way by executives that seem to disagree 
about whether the standard is met deprives it of legitimacy as a rule 
that users can reasonably agree to be bound by. The FOB might 
ultimately decide to apply the same standard—again, the benefits of 
the FOB are not necessarily to reach different or “better” outcomes. 
But if the FOB did decide to apply this test, it would need to explain 
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this decision publicly which would allow for greater consistency in 
its application as well as contestation about the appropriateness of 
the threshold in the first place. Similarly, public reasoning can 
excavate local context to inform users unfamiliar with it why a post 
has special meaning in different circumstances. But the importance 
of public reasoning is most evident in the reaction to the ultimate 
decision to take down Jones’ pages altogether. Although many 
commentators had been calling for his removal for some time, the 
response was mixed. Few defended Jones, but there was frustration 
with the way Facebook executed the ban and the lack of 
transparency around the reason or timing.300 Without public 
reasoning, even those that agreed with the decision thought it was 
illegitimate. 
The second example is from a different platform but illustrates 
the benefits of giving understandable rationales. David Neiwert’s 
Twitter account was suspended when he changed his profile picture 
to the cover of his book about the alt-right, which included KKK 
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hoods.301 Neiwert thought the suspension was wrong and refused to 
change the picture. From his perspective, the image was about 
analyzing hate, not promoting it. Representatives from Twitter 
reached out and explained that although they appreciated the 
distinction he was making, the company takes a no-tolerance stance 
on such images in profile pictures because they are more 
prominently displayed on the site. Neiwert wrote that the 
conversation “was cooperative and [they were] genuinely interested 
in my input. These Twitter officials were able to persuade me, at 
least, that they very much share my concerns.”302 Neiwert still 
disagreed with the decision, but once he understood the reasoning 
he agreed to change his profile picture and his account was 
reinstated. 
These examples illustrate the ultimate hope for the FOB. As 
Feldman summarizes: 
Some controversy and disagreement over the [FOB’s] decisions is 
inevitable. But even when it occurs, it will come in the context of the 
public understanding that Facebook is publicly and responsibly 
grappling with balancing values in cases that have no simple right 
answers. This repeated engagement should produce legitimacy for the 
decision process, and a new narrative for Facebook’s engagement with 
these problems.303 
Another benefit of public reasoning is its ability to help in norm-
setting. The FOB can provide contestation and explanation of norms 
in a more public forum. This in turn might make more community 
members aware of the rules which helps generate compliance. 
Grimmelman describes the importance of this aspect of moderation, 
saying that moderation’s “most important mission is to create strong 
shared norms among participants. . . . Moderators can influence 
norms directly by articulating them. They can do this either in 
general, with codes of conduct and other broad statements of rules, 
or in specific cases by praising good behavior and criticizing bad.”304 
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Matias similarly found that the visibility of the rules of online 
communities substantially increases compliance and overall 
participation in the community.305 By allowing greater visibility and 
participation in content moderation decisions through public 
reasoning, the FOB can embed the process of rule formation in a 
broader community and help norms be formed and tested. 
Public reasoning is also an important constraint on the FOB 
itself. Although it should be independent, this does not mean the 
FOB should be unconstrained. Giving principled reasons is the 
primary way that judges can be held accountable for their exercise 
of power.306 As Mark Tushnet writes, “the desideratum is not 
judicial independence alone but rather judicial independence 
coupled with accountability to law.”307 He explains that “without the 
latter, independent judges can act arbitrarily and so 
anticonstitutionally.”308 The FOB will need to develop a form of 
discourse, centered around norms, that distinguishes it from a mere 
political institution.309 It is the norms and constraints of principled 
reason-giving that will reassure users that they are not merely 
“exchanging one set of tyrants for another.”310 This legitimacy-
creating constraint is especially important when ambiguity is 
common. Accountability to law does not mean demonstration that 
the law requires a particular result. Indeed, as Rawls says, “public 
reason often allows more than one reasonable answer to any 
particular question.”311 What is important is not convincing people 
that the reasoning methods employed offer determinate outcomes 
but, as Roux has observed, that decision-makers should use 
 
 305 J. NATHAN MATIAS, PROCS. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENTISTS, 
PREVENTING HARASSMENT AND INCREASING GROUP PARTICIPATION THROUGH 
SOCIAL NORMS IN 2,190 ONLINE SCIENCE DISCUSSIONS (2019). 
 306 Roderick A. Macdonald & Hoi Kong, Judicial Independence as a 
Constitutional Virtue, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 831, 839 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012). 
 307 Tushnet, supra note 92, at 418–19. See also GUARNIERI & PEDERZOLI, supra 
note 189, at 45; Cross, supra note 135, at 558. 
 308 Tushnet, supra note 92, at 419 n.145; see also GUARNIERI & PEDERZOLI, 
supra note 189, at 196. 
 309 GUARNIERI & PEDERZOLI, supra note 189, at 196. 
 310 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 6 (1993). 
 311 RAWLS, supra note 28, at 240. 
OCT. 2019] Facebook's Oversight Board 73 
“methods that have come to be seen by the legal community and the 
broader legal culture as legitimate.”312 Public reasoning is the way 
in which the FOB can show its work in this regard. 
2. The Challenge of Giving Acceptable Reasons 
There are four particular aspects of the FOB’s context that will 
make its use of public reasoning to create legitimacy uniquely 
challenging. First, neither the FOB itself nor the community it 
speaks to are socialized in a particular style of discourse, such as 
legal reasoning. The FOB’s reasons and those that read them will 
not draw on what Llewellyn called law’s “steadying factors” which 
provides accepted doctrinal techniques for legal argument.313 
Judicial legitimacy is itself at least partially rooted in adherence to 
this craft.314 Of course, some contest the constraining power of these 
norms and even their existence at all.315 But most accept that legal 
decisions are something different to mere politics.316 So while there 
is some degree of choice, most constitutional scholars for example 
agree there is still something distinctively legal inherent in the 
process of constitutional construction.317 Setting aside the 
fundamental debate over legal realism, it is sufficient for present 
purposes to note that finding a mode of discourse that can be 
accepted as legitimizing in Facebook’s vast and diverse community 
will only be harder when not tied to a previously existing set of 
professional norms. 
This is exacerbated because, second, there are no accepted 
global norms to guide the substantive issues. Discussing the 
diversity of views on freedom of expression, Facebook’s Head of 
Global Policy Management has written:  
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Laws differ from country to country, not only in their text, but also in 
how their enforcement is pursued by authorities and how they are applied 
by courts. Even within the confines of one country, and even within 
common law jurisdictions, courts differ in their interpretation of laws. 
To complicate matters, laws evolve. New laws are passed, old laws are 
amended, and courts invalidate some laws altogether. . . . [E]ven 
assuming one government’s laws represent the social norms of its 
people, those laws will not represent the norms of every person on a 
global social media service.318 
Adopting international law standards does not simplify the 
matter. These are not universally endorsed.319 Nor are they 
themselves stable—for example, “international doctrine and 
practice relating to prohibition of hate speech remain uneven.”320 
Procedural elements of resolving disagreement are not so easily 
divorced from the underlying substance.321 Finding arguments that 
can reasonably be regarded as acceptable across such diverse 
substantive traditions will be especially challenging. 
Third, compounding the difficulties, Facebook does not have an 
underlying rationale for free speech on its platform to justify its 
choices. As Adrienne Stone notes, even in nation states, “identifying 
the value or set of values underlying any single constitutional system 
of freedom of expression is likely to be difficult.”322 For Facebook, 
it is even more difficult. What is the purpose of speech on Facebook? 
The simple answer that it generates revenue by capturing attention 
is not one that will help satisfactorily justify outcomes in difficult 
cases. But the three most common rationales from other traditions 
do not fit easily in the context of Facebook: facilitating self-
government, the search for truth, or respect for individual autonomy. 
This idea that freedom of expression is valuable because of its 
capacity to promote democratic self-government is the most widely 
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adopted in modern legal systems,323 but seems inappropriate in the 
context of Facebook. Facebook is not a democracy—it is a 
business.324 It does not rely on popular will in setting its rules (a brief 
experiment with a limited such system in 2009 failed due to poor 
voting levels). 325 It has expressly disavowed any conception of its 
platform as facilitating the search for truth.326 In any event, its 
algorithm manipulates the “marketplace of ideas” which is 
metaphorically said to lead to truth’s revelation. This leaves the third 
dominant justification for freedom of speech: that based on 
individual autonomy.327 Perhaps this is the most fitting 
understanding of Facebook’s justification for free speech, but still 
sits uneasily with the fact that Facebook regularly censors speech. It 
is therefore difficult to pin down any underlying theory behind 
Facebook’s content moderation system which could inform the 
FOB’s work, and which could satisfy those that disagree with the 
FOB’s decisions, that they are based on some more fundamental 
principle. As discussed above, Facebook’s statement of values 
might mitigate this, but only to a certain extent. A decision to 
prioritize “safety” would give a clear guiding principle in many 
individual decisions. But if Facebook decides its central value is 
“voice,” this will not necessarily make trade-offs easier. Whose 
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voice should be given priority, for example? Justifying decisions to 
prioritize voice without a thesis of the underlying purpose of voice 
will limit the extent to which justifications can legitimize choices. 
These are the challenges for the FOB fulfilling its role as an 
“exemplar of public reason.”328 Nevertheless, it is a central and 
important goal for the institution. As more expression occurs in 
these online spaces, it is unavoidable that there will need to be some 
body that performs this role of rationalizing contested and 
contestable decisions about how to regulate important public 
discourse. For now, the FOB is the first attempt at such an 
institution. It might be a canary in the coal mine of the future of 
online governance. No doubt, much will be learned from its 
successes and, perhaps inevitably, blunders. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The FOB represents an important innovation, and a welcome 
attempt to disperse the enormous power over online discourse held 
by Facebook. More importantly, however, it will serve to make that 
power more transparent and legitimate by facilitating dialogues 
around how and why Facebook’s power is exercised in the first 
place. This is a more modest goal than becoming an independent 
source of universally accepted free speech norms, but it is still 
incredibly ambitious for an institution that is breaking new ground. 
As Stone Sweet writes about constitutional courts in regime 
transitions: 
The ultimate measure of legitimacy for any [constitutional court] may 
well be its success at helping the polity construct a new constitutional 
identity’—a massive undertaking. . . . [A]s Scheppele writes, a 
[constitutional court] is often ‘the primary mechanism’ for organizing 
the transition away from the former ‘regime of horror’ to constitutional 
democracy. Insofar as [constitutional courts] are successful, the 
legitimacy of the constitution, as a basic framework for the exercise of 
public authority, will become indistinguishable from the regime’s 
political legitimacy.329 
For the best chances of success, Facebook and the FOB should 
be humble and acknowledge the very real limitations that such a 
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body will face. As a Facebook representative notes, “We are very 
much at the beginning of this process—it has not been done before 
. . . .”330 There is no true model to base the new body on. Deciding 
what the FOB will be includes accepting what it cannot be—this 
includes acknowledging that it cannot be a way to bring due process 
to any but the smallest fraction of content moderation decisions. Nor 
can it authoritatively resolve clashing ideas of freedom of 
expression. But, if done right, the FOB may be able to bring a greater 
sense of legitimacy and acceptance to Facebook’s content 
moderation ecosystem. This is a massive undertaking, and will 
require a healthy dose of “constitutional luck.”331 History teaches us 
that ultimately many variables for constitutional success are beyond 
the ability of designers to control, and success or failure is 
necessarily contingent. This may be unsatisfying. But the question 
should not be whether the FOB is inevitably a perfect institution or 
an ideal-type of due process and transparency that will bind 
Facebook to stringent human rights standards. The question for now 
is whether it is better than the alternative: the current haphazard, 
opaque process that draws inspiration from Kafka more than Kelsen. 
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